They're presumably already 99% of the way there. If the Secure Enclave can be updated on a locked phone, all they need to do is stop allowing that, right?<p>To me, the more profound consideration is this: if you use a strong alphanumeric password to unlock your phone, there is nothing Apple has been able to do for many years to unlock your phone. The AES-XTS key that protects data on the device is derived from your passcode, via PBKDF2. These devices were <i>already</i> fenced off from the DOJ, as long as their operators were savvy about opsec.
Any device that relies on hiding secrets inside the silicon itself is subject to hacking. Several secure-enclave like chips have been hacked in the past by using electron microscopes and direct probes on the silicon. If BlackHat conference independent security researchers have the resources to pull this off, Apple and the NSA certainly can. Exfiltrating the Enclave UID could be done by various mechanisms at the chip level, especially if you have access to the actual HW design and can fab devices to help.<p>I mean, we're talking about threat models where chip-level doping has been shown as an attack. This just seems to be a variation on the same claims of copy protection tamper resistant dongles we've had forever. That someone builds a secure system that is premised on a secret being held in a tiny tamper-resistant piece, only the tamper resistance is eventually cracked.<p>It might even be the case that you don't even need to exfiltrate the UID from the Enclave, what the FBI needs to do is test a large number of PIN codes without triggering the backoff timer or wipe. But the wipe mechanism and backoff timer runs in the application processor, not on the enclave, and so it is succeptable to cracking attacks the same way much copy protection techniques are.<p>You may not need to crack the OS, or even upload a new firmware. You just need to disable the mechanism that wipes the device and delays how many wrong tries you get. So for example, if you can manage to corrupt, or patch the part of the system that does that, then you can try thousands of PINs without worrying about triggering the timer or wipe, and without needing to upload a whole new firmware.<p>I used to crack disk protection on the Commodore 64 and no matter how sophisticated the mechanism all I really needed to do was figure out one memory location to insert a NOP into, or change a BNE/BEQ branch destination, and I was done. Cracking often came down to mutating 1 or 2 bytes in the whole system.<p>(BTW, why the downvote? If you think I'm wrong, post a rebuttal)
I've been very impressed with what I've learned in the last few weeks regarding Apple's efforts to provide privacy for its customer using what it seems some very robust engineering and design. I'm currently an Android user (Samsung S6 edge) but am considering seriously going back to the iPhone because of this.<p>The cynical side of me says that Apple's marketing tactics have worked. But I've got a feeling, heck, I <i>want</i> to believe, that this is actually driven by company values and not a short-term marketing benefit.
A lot of the comments on that article burn me up. People in the U.S. really think there's a terrorism problem here. The only problem is that government spending so much money on a non-issue! Politicians love to "debate" it because they know it is one of those things that looks good to the naive citizens but they really don't have to do anything because there's nothing to be done.
It's important to emphasize something: iCloud will always be "backdoored", by design, and backing up to iCloud is what most users should and will be doing.<p>The reason iCloud data will always be accessible by Apple, and thus governments, is not because Apple wants to make it accessible to governments. It's so that Apple can offer customers the very important feature of accessing their own data if they forget or otherwise don't have the password. That is an essential feature, and why this aspect will never change.<p>When someone passes away, for example, it would be a terrible compounding tragedy if all their photos from their whole life passed away along with them, because they didn't tell anyone their password or where they kept the backup key. So Apple wants and needs to provide an alternative way to recover the account. (For example, they will provide access to a deceased person's account if their spouse can obtain a court order proving the death and relationship.)<p>Harvard recent published a paper (called "Don't Panic") that essentially states the same.[1] Governments shouldn't "panic" because in most cases, consumers will not be exclusively using unbreakable encryption, because it has tradeoffs that aren't always desirable.<p>And the reason why most consumer should be backing up to iCloud is similar: that's how you prevent the tragedy of losing your data if you lose your phone.<p>Just something to keep in mind when discussing the "going dark" and "unhackable" news items.<p>It is worth noting however that people who do "have something to hide" from governments probably won't be using iCloud, if they know what they're doing. Then again if they know what they're doing, they wouldn't use anything that is backdoored anyway. So the naive criminals will still probably be hackable, and that's about all we can hope for.<p>[1] <a href="https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/pubrelease/dont-panic/Dont_Panic_Making_Progress_on_Going_Dark_Debate.pdf" rel="nofollow">https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/pubrelease/dont-panic/Dont_Pan...</a>
This is all just theatre. The real motivation is to control the platform: to ship a piece of hardware that dictates who can install stuff on it, instead of the traditional hardware that lets you completely overwrite everything in it if you have physical access.<p>Since 197X, people had home computers (and institutional computers for two decades before that) on which the FBI could install anything they want, if that equipment fell into their hands. This fact never made news headlines; it was taken for granted that the computer is basically the digital equivalent of a piece of stationery, written in pencil.<p>There is nothing wrong with that situation, and on such equipment, you can secure your <i>data</i> just fine.<p>No machine can be trusted if it fell under someone's physical access. Here is a proof: if I get my hands on your device, I can <i>replace</i> it with a physically identical device which looks exactly like yours, but is actually a man-in-the-middle (MITM). (I can put the fake device's board into your original plastic and glass, so it will have the same scratches, wear, grime pattern and whatever other markings that distinguish the device as yours.) My fake device will collect the credentials which you enter. Those are immediately sent to me and I play them against the real device to get in.<p>Apple are trying to portray themselves as a champion of security, making clueless users believe that the security of a device rests in the manufacturer's hands. This could all be in <i>collaboration</i> with the FBI, for all we know. Two versions of Big Brother are playing the "good guy/bad guy" routine, so you would trust the good guy, who is basically just one of the faces of the same thing.
What is to stop the DOJ from requiring them to produce a phone that has a hardware backdoor? If they are required to produce a software backdoor then building an iphone which is immune to such vulnerabilities seemingly solves that problem but I don't see the leap towards compelling Apple to build vulnerabilities into hardware as a large one.<p>I'm not well versed in security so excuse me for my ignorance but what if there were a way to solder chip onto the board that allows access to the secure enclave. Every time an iphone is made a companion chip is produced that contains some kind of access key which only works for that device and someone is required to foot the bill for storing them.
@everyone: All this hubbub and no guarantee the phone wasn't already wiped and/or doesn't contain any sensitive information because they didn't use that phone for those purposes.<p>@Udik: I could just keep my tax documents in printed plaintext on top of my dresser but I opt to keep them locked up. Privacy and security are important. If people who utilize privacy/security tools are up to no good then why does the U.S. Gov't have a clause for not revealing information due to State Secrets? Why do we set our Facebook profiles to private? Why have passwords at all on anything? Are you beginning to see the point?
that's the endgame of government surveillance requests: it's increasingly in a company's best interest to have the best security possible so they can't be compelled to hack their own devices.
Darn... this, along with the fact that the MacBook Pro my work gave me is so much better than I expected, is making it harder for me not to become full-on Apple convert.
My last write-up on smartphone risks applies to this discussion.<p><a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10906999" rel="nofollow">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10906999</a><p>Apple is far from having a secure phone right now. NSA certainly has ways to bypass this based on my attack framework and their prior work. They just don't want them to be known. They pulled the same stuff in the past where FBI talked about how they couldn't beat iPhones but NSA had them in the leaks & was parallel constructing to FBI. So, the current crop are probably compromised but reserved for targets worth the risk.<p>That said, modifying CPU to enable memory + I/O safety, restricting baseband, an isolation flow for hardware, and some software changes could make a system where 0-days were rare enough to be worth much more. Oh yeah, they'll have to remove the debugging crap out of their chips and add TEMPEST shielding. Good luck getting either of those two done. ;)
What I want is a service that deletes all my online presence after I die. A deadswitch. All texts, messages, emails, facebook posts, pictures anywhere, <i>everything</i>.<p>I want it all to go when I do. Hell, I want some of it to go now.<p>After I'm gone, I want to leave no part of my existence on the internet.<p>I realize that's not possible. But I want to minimize my footprint.<p>It is totally possible for a local device. I have a deadswitch on all my computers. If I don't log in and set an alive flag via the command line in any of my computers for more than a week, that computer securely wipes itself.<p>Let it be known, I have nothing to hide. I just think this is the best way to do things.<p>Edit: My reason for this is the frequency with which I encounter people who are no longer alive. It's a harsh thing to look at a link to someone who said something, and you used to know and then suddenly realize, "Oh shit. He's dead. And I used to be his best friend."<p>I know facebook has memorial pages, but those are difficult to get.
One aspect of what all this comes down to is that governments don't want to have to do real work or even prioritize their tracking and surveillance.<p>What encryption and security really does is create scarcity of access to information and data in order to force a market solution where government groups have to prioritize their efforts and apply them deliberately.
Good. Congress shall pass no law abridging freedom of speech, and code has been ruled free speech.<p>The only reason previous wiretapping laws were passed is because they weren't in the limelight and the public never had a chance to weigh in. <i>Let's make this an election issue</i>
"Impossible for security agency to hack"<p>Nothing is 100% proof, crypto certainly isn't. It's going from child's play to "you actually need to knowledge" to "this is actually hard now" (but.. not impossible).
Hmmm... this absolutest attitude by Apple begs the question for me, are we SURE we want to have phones that absolutely cannot be unlocked when the owner is no where to be found/dead?<p>It's such a grey area and I will probably get down voted for commenting this way. I 100% agree that the power, in the wrong hands, is horrible, but can't we talk about this in a way where there's some kind of middle ground? All I've been reading are either extremes.
The original story has changed its title to "Apple Is Said to Be Trying to Make It Harder to Hack iPhones".<p>I was a bit surprised by the clickbait-y nature of the HN title, but we can see in the nytimes URL that this "Apple Is Said to Be Working on an iPhone Even It Can’t Hack" was the original title, eh.
The problem with software is that none have been 100% secure yet... I doubt that Apple will be able to achieve that in the near future. Someone should send a phone to John Mcafee at the very least [1][2] ...<p>1. <a href="http://www.pcgamer.com/john-mcafee-on-his-fbi-iphone-hack-offer-our-government-is-illiterate-in-cybersecurity/" rel="nofollow">http://www.pcgamer.com/john-mcafee-on-his-fbi-iphone-hack-of...</a><p>2. <a href="http://arstechnica.com/staff/2016/02/mcafee-will-break-iphone-crypto-for-fbi-in-3-weeks-or-eat-shoe-on-live-tv/" rel="nofollow">http://arstechnica.com/staff/2016/02/mcafee-will-break-iphon...</a><p>edit: added source #2; see Google for additional sources...
Could Apple not push an OS update that can compromise everything they are doing to make the iPhone unhackable? As long as user has to trust Apple there's always going to be the possibility that FBI/NSA/Whoever force Apple to update a target's iPhone to enable tracking/recording of whatever information.<p>It's not an attainable goal in practice. Today they generate a per device customized update that can be installed without user intervention. Even if they tomorrow enforce user intervention they still retain the capability to push a targeted update for a specific device on law enforcement/court order. The user has no way of telling what the update did.
The article doesn't cite a source. It doesn't even say that it is anonymously sourced from someone close to Apple (who presumably is leaking). That makes me wonder if the real source of this info is Apple-approved, and sort of an indirect way of engaging policymakers. I get the sense that Apple is picking a fight b/c the DOJ has violating an unwritten agreement, basically that Apple will provide all the help requested, informally, as long as the DOJ doesn't push for court orders or new laws that tie Apple's hands in constructing its devices and the software that runs on them.
When will personal technology legally be considered an extension of our minds?<p>Full disclosure I understand this was a persons work phone. This is a statement which is solely being posted to stimulate theoretical discussion.
As much as I <3 Apple, they're still a SPoF just like Lavabit or anyone else with centralized servers that aren't "SWAT-resistant." If iDevices could work without iCloud and usefully communicate with each other directly (sans cell network too), that would be impressive... storage, processing and wireless tech are all getting cheaper... p2p "iCloud" might be within the realm of not-quite-insane.<p>(Somehow, I feel iMessage and related apps are MITMable because there is no mandatory, mutual, out-of-band validation of a recipient's identity.)
If Congress does pass such laws, I would love it if Apple considered security so important to it's product vision that they'd be willing to use their cash reserves to restructure the company and engineering and moving it's security engineering to a country that pledges never to force it to compromise on security. Apple is no stranger to keeping internal secrets and keeping concerns isolated. I have no doubt that they could find a way to guarantee security. IMHO governments are security bugs to be patched.
If this means that there's going to be some hardware measures in the iPhone itself that would prevent multiple passcode entry attempts then that'd be good. Otherwise, as long there's that "troubleshooting" system that can update/reinstall the firmware without the passcode and all measures taken to prevent brute forcing the passcode out are built in the software, it's all talk. There's nothing enlightening in this article.
This marks a very interesting time in my opinion. We have corporations with more money with governments making (or at least attempting to make) certain social decisions once reserved for only public sector government officials. If Apple is successful here, it will usher in a new era of what a private company can do.
They can have perfect hardware crypto, but they can always send a new OS update to every phone with "if your account id is in top 100 wanted, send a copy of everything to x.y.z". Nobody would ever know (until it's too late, at least)<p>(of course if the phone is not in use anymore it doesn't apply)
My Nexus 6 running Android 6.0.1 is encrypted and uses hardware backed credential storage.<p>If the software (Android) had the same type of protection (if the wrong PIN is entered 10 times it destroys the key), would this device be at par with the iOS approach?
Could DOJ slap Apple with an injunction forbidding deployments of new iOS releases until the San Bernadino case is concluded?<p>If Apple can't launch new iOS versions, can they still launch new iPhones?
How about you simply encrypt your data store? There's no reason you can't encrypt things in such a way that your operating system does not have direct access to it.
This is one of those moments I wish Jobs was still here.<p>Had he lost to the DOJ, here is what would (might) have happened:<p>- he would gladly unlocked this phone and bill DOJ for the time spent on redesigning IOS<p>- going forward, he would label each phone's box in red letters: CONTAINS GOVERNMENT-REQUIRED BACKDOOR (I doubt Gov can forbid him from doing that)<p>- he would then stop selling devices in Apple stores directly and only allow to order them in stores with direct home delivery from Apple website hosted and operated outside USA.<p>- all the shipping would be done directly from China by-passing US-tax system all together.<p>- shortly after he would remove the backdoor IOs for devices that are not directly sold on US soil<p>That would be a big fat middle finger to the DOJ.