I host multiple onion services, mainly for email proxies and firewall traversal, and this is exactly the reason I use stealth onion services.<p>With this setup, only those client machines onto which I pre-load a cookie can decrypt a per-client encrypted copy of the "introduction point contact info" part of the descriptor. Malicious HSDirs wouldn't even know where to introduce themselves to my services, let alone the correct cookie for the INTRODUCE2 cells.<p>If you want to host an onion service, but don't want it publicly accessible, use 'HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient'.
Isn't it obvious by now that Tor is outdated and instead of trying to repair it, something next-gen should be devised? IPFS looks like a good starting point, and unlike Tor, it sounds like it has a real shot to evolve if enough people stand behind it (since its various components aren't glued together and allow for new protocol elements in the stack).<p>I am aware IPFS has limitations and that there are valid P2P attacks to which it either couldn't resist well (reduced capacity) or it could straight out give away its users IP addresses -- but hey, in my opinion Tor has been mostly compromised by authorities around the world and is currently widely used to persecute people -- some of which might simply be paranoid like myself and dislike being tracked, <i>without doing anything illegal</i>.<p>Doesn't that mean that Tor has outlived its usefulness?<p>Must we be afraid or tracking and profiling everywhere we go on the net? Have the bad guys already won?