<i>Some</i> of the analysis in the article is rather on point; but to me it solidifies the belief that the 'Google of the Future' will be like the 'Microsoft of Today': possessing a large portfolio of diverse, user- and business-centric services, some premium, some free.<p>They'll collect data from their free services, they'll run an ad network, they'll run several social and/or communications networks, so they still have access to social graphs and interests. They may even produce or aggregate some content on content portals like Microsoft does with MSN. They'll make some of their money from display ads, but less than they do now. Meanwhile they'll have subscription-based products from which they'll derive the rest of their revenue.<p>It's tempting to look at where Google's current revenue comes from and accuse them of being a one-trick pony, but they've done what like Microsoft did in the 1990s and have ingrained themselves into the daily lives of people, through Gmail, Android, Chrome, Drive, Docs, and more niche ones like Hangouts, Allo/Duo, Google Photos. They're even guilty of some of the same mistakes as Microsoft: confusing product strategies and messaging, letting some services stagnate for years, sudden shutdown of others and releasing a hip new but slightly inferior alternative soon after.<p>The transformation of ad consumption and the relevance of search in the app-driven, app-curated world; these are all good points raised in the article. But I think Google's current set of non-money-making products is exactly what will save them from Yahoo's fate -- you may no longer search with Google, you may not even <i>like</i> Google, but all your files and personal data is still going to be with them, their OS running on your phones and laptops, and network effects and platform lock-in (in the sense that it's not worth the effort to switch) will keep people with Google for years to come.