I voted up this link (after it appeared on the front page) but precisely because I think it is such ridiculous hooey that it is worth commenting on. It's errors are abundant so I'll choose just one which, taken as paradigm, can be used to discover several others:<p>The author of the article quotes Hitchens as saying (I've added <i>emphasis</i>): "[C]onscience is innate," and `[e]verybody but the psychopath' has the `feeling' that this is so. This `innate conscience' is what makes murder and theft `abhorrent to humans <i>without any further explanation</i>'; it is what gives children an `innate sense of fairness'; and it is what informs each of us of our `duty to others.'"<p>Now, Hitchens is perfectly comprehensible there and there is ample objective empirical evidence to back him up. The author has made a fine enough paraphrase of one of Hitchens' main points. The author of the article immediately goes on to err very badly:<p>Let's pick apart his next few sentences:<p>"The notion of an `innate conscience' is, of course, not original to Hitchens; the history of philosophy is replete with appeals to a `moral sense' or `moral intuition' or `moral law within.'"<p>Pardon me but <i>philosophy has nothing to do with it</i>. Such philosophers as the author refers to are trying to <i>explain</i> the fact that, by in large, we know right from wrong. As Hitchens asserted, we know things about morality and we know that we know these things "without need for further explanation". The author of the article ignores those words and proceeds to assume, behind Hitchens' simple statement, an implicit explanation. Once he does so, he is no longer arguing against Hitchens, he is arguing against a straw-man.<p>To borrow an example from a writer I like: Suppose you and I are sitting at the bar of a pub, chatting about sports. One of the patron's very friendly dogs is sitting outside waiting patiently, tied to a parking meter. A fellow walks by on the sidewalk and without provocation kicks the dog, hard.<p>Now, do we need to discuss what in scripture forbids such an act? Do we need to question whether our Kantian faculty for moral reasoning rings true when it signals the evil of such an act? Or do we just immediately agree that "That ain't right" and perhaps step outside to confront the man what done it? Is <i>anything</i> added to our obvious and gut-level reaction by additional discussion of where, in principle, that reaction comes from? Or can we just stipulate that it was in fact wrong to kick the dog and that almost certainly intervention is called for?<p>We do not need God in order to decide that kicking the dog was wrong. We do not need Kant or Descartes. We do not need debate. "Hey, look: that guy just kicked that dog!" What more do you need? Perhaps the philosopher at the other end of the bar will say "No, perhaps he kicked the dog to prevent a larger tragedy." Perhaps the theist next to him will point out the dog's place as chattel in the divine order of things. Perhaps the evolutionary biologist will try to stay our intervention by pointing out that we are reacting to genetically programmed perceptions. Perhaps the Taoist will solemnly observe that the dog can not experience pleasure unless it also experiences pain. Have any of these stooges added anything worthy of the moment? No, of course not. The situation needs no discussion - no explanation. What would happen, in real life, is that a large number of patrons of the pub would rise to intervene - <i>and next to nobody would blame them</i>. And this would be a moral reaction. We know right from wrong when we see it laid bare. No further explanation needed.<p>In order to "argue" with Hitchens, the author posits an "explanation" for this knowing and then proceeds to tear apart that explanation: a kind of intellectual onanism.<p>I do not mean, to answer how the author of the article burbles on, that we always make right choices or that we always agree about what the right choices are. Of course we do not. We generally agree (though not universally) in recognizing extreme cases of sociopathy. We all make moral mistakes, often tragic. We all are sometimes slow if not entirely unable to recognize our mistakes. These are separate questions and positing God, Kantian moral faculties, evolutionary proscriptions, etc. -- these add nothing to the conversation with the possible partial exception of the evolutionary psychiatrists who can at least provide some partial post-mortem analysis of failings, sometimes.<p>The author continues:<p>"But although many have appealed to such a sense, none has ever been able to overcome the fact that it is observationally false that humans possess an innate sense of right and wrong: Many people, and not just psychopaths, make horrifically bad choices that ruin their own lives, the lives of others, or both."<p>How this contradicts Hitchens is a truth to be found only in the authors' own imagination. Yes, tragedy happens. And yes, not everything is clear cut, especially in the heat of a decision-making moment.<p>"And not all of these people know that their actions are morally wrong. On the contrary, many believe that their actions are morally justified."<p>None of which contradicts anything Hitchens' said. The author seems to have assumed that Hitchens was talking about, to sling jargon around, an infallible moral faculty present in all but psychopaths. Had Hitchens ever, anywhere, argued for such a thing the author would have a point. Hitchens didn't. The author doesn't.