Highlights:<p>> At this point, the only responsible course of action is for the CIA to notify equipment manufacturers and software developers of the exploits they are aware of, so that the software can be secured.<p>...as well as:
> The CIA chose to stay silent about vulnerabilities that could be used by hackers from other countries or governments.<p>and:
> Unfortunately, the mainstream media's coverage of this event fails to mention an important consequence of the leak. While its technical disclosures only confirm what industry professionals long suspected (Matt Green, a cryptographer at Johns Hopkins University, said that the list of cyberweapons was "impressive" but not unexpected), they also reveal that details of the cyberweapons circulated among unauthorized individuals, and the existence of the leaks mean that the technical details surrounding the cyberweapons themselves could potentially be in the hands of foreign adversaries.<p>and to close:
> The Vault 7 leak is empirical proof that a backdoor for the government is a vulnerability regardless, and that these tools will inevitably end up in the wrong hands.