I'm beginning to think that running <i>any</i> software on the same physical machine where secure code needs to run is a liability. Someone could backdoor a stupid useless utility and grab important keys.<p>What scares me is virtualization; could this attack be practical on EC2 across guests instead of hyperthreading? (I know there's a very large difference in the way these two concepts work)<p>Finally, how exactly is this possible with a EDDSA or Ed25519 based ECC curve? The claim to fame there is that because they don't branch, side channel attacks are much harder.
More details today at The Register
<a href="https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/06/22/intel_tlbleed_key_data_leak/" rel="nofollow">https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/06/22/intel_tlbleed_key_d...</a>