In response to future 'trim system/AOA sensor' comments: Transport aircraft have a procedure to cut out a runaway/malfunctioning trim or stick pusher. Usually, this procedure is to press and hold the autopilot disconnect button on the yoke/stick or the trim switch and then, later, deactivate the system. The pressing of the autopilot disconnect button or trim switch is a 'memory item', meaning that it should be performed immediately, without a checklist, upon recognizing that there's a problem. Previously, this malfunction has been a rare occurrence, and so can be startling to pilots or not immediately recognized. I've seen pilots fail to apply the procedure and crash many times in the simulator, even after being told it was coming. It could be said that the pilots of the Lion Air aircraft and, potentially, this Ethiopian aircraft should have known the procedure and reacted properly, however, for Boeing to put them in this situation is, in my opinion, also quite hazardous. With so many hastily trained and low-competence airline pilots flying around, should we really rely on them to understand the technology and react properly?
I predict that this is going to end up being a software error related to the angle of attack sensor (Boeing reported possible problems with the AOA on 11/7/2018)<p>basis: none whatsoever; just a guess.<p>[1] <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/airlines-that-fly-the-boeing-737-max-2018-11" rel="nofollow">https://www.businessinsider.com/airlines-that-fly-the-boeing...</a>
Second 737 Max to go down within the span of a few months.<p>I hope it's a coincidence, but that can't look good on Boeing.<p>E: Removed the word 'sure'
I just read that the software update for MCAS (the Lion Air crash cause) had been delayed and isn't rolling out until next month. If that's true, seems to raise the probability of this being a similar MCAS issue.
Does someone here know offhand the fatality rate for the Max per flying hour at this time?<p><a href="http://www.airsafe.com/events/models/rate_mod.htm" rel="nofollow">http://www.airsafe.com/events/models/rate_mod.htm</a> lumps max together with other 737 models, which of course turns out to be very safe.
If this is a software error should someone be held responsible? Developer? QA? Manager? Did they follow their process? Kind of scary for us to think of...
Honestly, I know people often jump in here with technical comments on stories like these, but posting this stuff on HN always just feels like rubbernecking to me.