If this interests you, check out their previous paper about generalised consensus: <a href="https://blog.acolyer.org/2019/03/08/a-generalised-solution-to-distributed-consensus/" rel="nofollow">https://blog.acolyer.org/2019/03/08/a-generalised-solution-t...</a><p>I really like how understandable it is.
Part 2 <a href="https://blog.acolyer.org/2019/05/08/distributed-consensus-revised-part-ii/" rel="nofollow">https://blog.acolyer.org/2019/05/08/distributed-consensus-re...</a>
The Avalanche protocol by Emin Gün Sirer appears to be a breakthrough in this field, apparently even more general in nature than Hashgraph.<p><a href="https://youtu.be/AXrrqtFlGow" rel="nofollow">https://youtu.be/AXrrqtFlGow</a>
It'd almost certainly seem interesting to see whether one might manage to crosspollinate the above paper with this 'recent' generalization result from parameterized computational social choice theory:<p><a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1711.06030" rel="nofollow">https://arxiv.org/abs/1711.06030</a><p>(Published version, closed access: <a href="https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3278739" rel="nofollow">https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3278739</a>)<p>Aziz, Haris; Lee, Barton E. – Sub-committee Approval Voting and Generalised Justified Representation Axioms (2017/2018)<p>Abstract:<p>"Social choice is replete with various settings including single-winner voting, multi-winner voting, probabilistic voting, multiple referenda, and public decision making. We study a general model of social choice called sub-committee voting (SCV) that simultaneously generalizes these settings. We then focus on sub-committee voting with approvals and propose extensions of the justified representation axioms that have been considered for proportional representation in approval-based committee voting. We study the properties and relations of these axioms. For each of the axioms, we analyze whether a representative committee exists and also examine the complexity of computing and verifying such a committee."<p>Citations: <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cites=5804298394619698922" rel="nofollow">https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cites=5804298394619698922</a><p>And then, perhaps, <i>that theorem of infamity by that dude who might have gone by—some name(, like, uh, )—'Aumann'</i>