This is blogspam from over a month ago.<p>Here's the official release from Boeing that this is just reiterating (from May 5): <a href="https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-releases-statements?item=130431" rel="nofollow">https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-releases-statements?item=1...</a><p>NYTimes article: <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/05/business/boeing-737-max-warning-light.html" rel="nofollow">https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/05/business/boeing-737-max-w...</a><p>HN discussion of that article: <a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19835608" rel="nofollow">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19835608</a>
<i>"Senior company leadership was not involved in the review and first became aware of this issue in the aftermath of the Lion Air accident."</i><p>i.e. the buck stops somewhere else!
First line: In 2017, Boeing learned that the angle-of-attack (AOA) disagree alert — a standard feature on all 737 MAX aircraft — didn't work on the majority of the planes. The company determined that the alert was not necessary for safe operation, so it did not inform operators or the FAA.<p>So all those lives could have been saved and they knew it in 2017? And they let two crashes happen? Explain that to the ones who got left behind...
This is an interesting point. Some will argue that the AOA disagree indicator wouldn't have made any difference in either crash. But it seems like it <i>would</i> have caused Lion Air to take their aircraft out of service and fix the problem after it occurred on the penultimate flight.<p>Of course, the fact that they kept the aircraft in service without bothering to diagnose the issue that almost got everyone killed on the previous flight is a counterargument in itself. There's more than enough gross negligence to go around in this case, unfortunately.<p>Edit: actually, it appears that Lion didn't spring for the "optional" warning indicator feature in the first place.
Boeing should be fined enough that "shareholder value" would be roughly zero after all the assets are sold to pay the fine.<p>That (besides any personal penalty that might be appropriate, of course) might realign the incentives for the next set of managers facing similar choices somewhere else, but it won't happen.
<The company said that a Boeing-convened safety review board affirmed in December that the absence of the AOA disagree alert from flight displays would not have presented a safety issue.<p>The FAA confirmed the discussion and that it deemed the issue "low risk" at the time.><p>So the FAA is culpable as well as Boeing
Still wondering about why 737 NGs (-600,-700,-800,-900) are still deemed "airworthy" despite the 2010 investigative report on Boeing's intentional deception and cover-up of Ducommun's absurdly dangerous and substandard critical structural fuselage components. Several passengers have already died from fuselage breakups from hard landings and runway overruns when previous aircraft have survived similar situations intact; plus the possibility of aircraft catastrophically breaking up in heavy turbulence.
It’s not clear the AOA disagree light would have saved the two flights, so waiting for the next release was reasonable.<p>The critical jump pilots had to make was that this was a trim runaway event. AOA indicators were not connected to the trim system before.