All software is buggy. The problem with the MCAS system is that pilots were not informed that it was there, nor were they given a way to override it and take full control of the airplane. Also, while the MCAS system relied on two sensors, if either failed, the MCAS system itself failed, so there was no built in back-up for it.<p>Bugs in software happen because situations where they arise are sometimes hard to predict. You can test your software all you want but it's not until it's in the field that you start discovering new issues because people tend to do things in ways developers didn't consider.<p>Tesla's software has over a billion miles of data on it and it still has issues in some basic functionality. And let's not talk about Iowa which in itself was a major failure in software release management.
I think the main thing we are seeing here is hundreds of smaller fixes that usually form the steady stream of Airworthiness Directives that an aircraft currently supported by the manufacturer sees turning into a news event every single time one comes out.<p>So far only one "aircraft" has had perfect software, and that was the Space Shuttle, every single other aircraft out there has had software issues that are worked out over the life of the aircraft, just like every piece of software, even that which has very strict testing regimes, has had defects in it.
I really wonder about these large engineering corporations, Toyota seems to have similar problems with software.<p>Part of me feels like many of these companies don’t keep code secret to protect IP, instead they do it because they know it’s a burning train wreck and don’t want people to find out.
So not only are they trying to fix a fundamental hardware issue with a software patch, their inability to do software properly extends beyond just their MCAS system? This is a good reminder that air travel's extraordinary safety record isn't just a given, it's something that takes real work to achieve and when the people responsible for putting in that work (Boeing, regulators) begin taking safety for granted, that's when people die.
As a former software defense worker, I wish there were 3rd party audits of code and dev ops. If you saw the code that's flying in missiles, aircraft, etc and how they got there youd want to go live in a cave.
> designed to warn of a malfunction by a system that helps raise and lower the plane’s nose<p>So, they can't even name the mcas system anymore?
In their defense, probably every piece of software of any complexity at all has bugs waiting to be found, and it's not super surprising that they found some new ones while doing a rigorous testing regimen.
There is a less than zero chance I'll be boarding one of these planes again, ever. Trust is an important idea in any product, but particularly in areas like aviation, and I don't see how they can possibly build it back.<p>I <i>do</i> see an opportunity for software that ensures you are only booking journeys on the aircraft you feel are safe.
> Asked about a likely date for a return to service for the Max, Dickson said it isn’t helpful to talk about timelines. Boeing needs to concentrate on making complete, quality submissions on its fixes for the plane, he said.<p>Ahh, "we'll ship it when it's ready, not on some arbitrary deadline." Music to any engineer/builder's ears.
Can someone explain how a hugely complex machine with mostly parallel working analog parts fits into the digital computing paradigm? Isn't it predetermined to fail under extreme conditions, like those that are found while flying inbetween clouds and thunderstorms with all that pressure and fluctuations? How does sampling not fail, like, all the time? What kind of tooling is being used to mitigate for all these? Does anyone know?
I'm shocked they keep publicly working on this plane.<p>I get that planes cost more money than I can fathom, and that making a whole fleet of impossible amounts of money costs a gazillion dollars. Still, this one seems spent. Nobody is going to knowingly fly on a 737 Max.<p>They ought to have retired the plane last year. They can design a new plane (that because of economics, will probably be very similar to this plane), release it when it's been properly vetted, swap out Maxes for it, retrofit those Maxes, etc.<p>I realize this is naive armchair quarterbacking from someone who has never worked in aviation, but there's a reason that Philip Morris is called Altria now and that Weinstein Co was merged into Spyglass. If the public doesn't trust your brand, no amount of "but we fixed it with this patch we rushed out the door" is going to change that.
I hope these planes get scrapped and never see flight again. Tear them down and recycle the parts, and build something that's modern from the group up instead of recycled, deprecated bullshit.