It's weird how the "hardware disconnect" term for the pre-2019 devices was stretched to include a firmware, that is software-only, feature. Kinda like the "end to end encryption" of Zoom. Glad that Apple resolved this for newer devices. I'd still love to see wiring diagrams or explanations how it actually works. Which kind of circuit do they use? Is it the power line that's suppressed or the data line? Is it only an analog line that's suppressed and if you tune up internal amp you might be getting some residual?<p>About the iPads, what does their "hardware" based microphone disconnect entail? It has to be some electro-magnetic based communication instead of currents so the circuit has to be more complicated. I doubt it's done without using any kind of software but would be glad to hear otherwise.<p>Overall, I'm glad that they are responding to concerns and working to address them.
Despite Apple's anti-competitive ways, I am often impressed with their attention to details such as these. Glad there is still sanity out there in the world of "always listening" devices.
I always wondered why the microphone on my MacBook Pro would stop working whenever I closed the lid when using my external monitor. Glad to hear the "bug" exists for good reasons.
I would rather have a physical (manual) switch to disconnect the power to the microphone and camera hardware on all my devices (laptop, phone, ...). This way there would be no need to trust the Security Chip and there would be no attack vectors and possible future zero-day attacks on the security chip...
> All Mac portables with the Apple T2 Security Chip feature a hardware disconnect
that ensures the microphone is disabled whenever the lid is closed.<p>vs.<p>> On the 13-inch MacBook Pro and MacBook Air computers with the T2 chip, and on the 15-inch MacBook Pro portables from 2019 or later, this disconnect is implemented in hardware alone.<p>Do these statements not contradict each other for the 15" 2018 MacBook Pro, for example, which includes a T2 chip? This would also contradict earlier documentation provided on the T2 chip by Apple themselves [1].<p>From [1]:<p>> All Mac portables with the Apple T2 Security Chip feature a hardware disconnect that ensures that the microphone is disabled whenever the lid is closed. This disconnect is implemented in hardware alone, and therefore prevents any software, even with root or kernel privileges in macOS, and even the software on the T2 chip, from engaging the microphone when the lid is closed.<p>[1] <a href="https://www.apple.com/euro/mac/shared/docs/Apple_T2_Security_Chip_Overview.pdf" rel="nofollow">https://www.apple.com/euro/mac/shared/docs/Apple_T2_Security...</a> (October 2018, page 13)
Apple in 2020 is such a weird thing. Some of the things they produce - mostly in the software realm, I guess - have really careless and egregious bugs and design problems. But then they still come out and make amazing little features like this one that nobody thought to ask for, and don't get highly publicized, but really speak to that classic detail-oriented Apple mindset.<p>It's like there's a huge cultural schism running through the middle of the company, or something.
> iPad models beginning in 2020 also feature the hardware microphone disconnect. When an MFI compliant case (including those sold by Apple) is attached to the iPad and closed, the microphone is disconnected in hardware<p>does this mean Hey Siri won't work on an iPad with a closed cover?
Why doesn’t Apple have an option for buying a MacBook Pro with the camera and mic physically disconnected? They could sell this option at an appropriately priced premium — along with a stylish Bluetooth-connected, 4K webcam with phased array mics for a very reasonably $499. I’m sure they would sell hundreds of thousands of them.<p>If ANYBODY could monetize “security chic” it’s Apple.
Does it really matter if they have a hardware disconnect, when the hardware disconnect is controlled by software? It's not truly a hardware disconnect unless there's a physical switch that the user can flip on or off.
Perhaps this is the hardware people are speculating about with magnetic switches?<p><a href="https://www.ifixit.com/News/33952/apple-put-a-hinge-sensor-in-the-16-macbook-pro-what-could-it-be-for" rel="nofollow">https://www.ifixit.com/News/33952/apple-put-a-hinge-sensor-i...</a><p>Though it seems their "hardware only" solution was on earlier models than that, so maybe not.
> <i>(The camera is not disconnected in hardware, because its field of view is completely obstructed with the lid closed.)</i><p>I love this aside xD
They do not reveal how this is implemented at the physical level. I'd think such a statement should be accompanied by a circuit diagram.<p>The simplest and most fool proof method is a physical switch that interrupts the mic lead. If you want it to be 'pop and crackle' free you may have to fiddle a bit or use a make-before-break switch and connect the other line to ground. No amount of software hacking will get around that, and the position of the switch is good feedback that you are not open to eavesdropping. Anything less than that is likely hackable in some way or other.
And yet they’re still not encrypting iCloud Backups in a way that doesn’t allow Apple (and by extension the federal police) unfettered access to spying on iMessage. iCloud Backup is on by default, so this means that iMessage for almost every iPhone user is insecure. Incongruent.<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusive/exclusive-apple-dropped-plan-for-encrypting-backups-after-fbi-complained-sources-idUSKBN1ZK1CT" rel="nofollow">https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusiv...</a>
Would also be nice to have little hardware LEDs that automatically turn on when the microphone or camera are connected. That way you are sure to know if they are recording.
This may be Apple's first real response to the checkm8 vulnerability. It had already been fixed on the current iOS devices as of its disclosure, but the T2 chip is still shipping (and is currently on computers that will last for a decade versus phones that last two years) with no fix AFAIK.<p>Apple could fix T2s going forward, but it would require a BootROM change not just a software update.
This is not enough, the sane solution needs physical switches like the Lenovo T400 had for WiFi.<p>Where are the real laptops? I'm tired of the glossy short screens, lack of ethernet connections and crappy keyboards (this applies both to Lenovo and Apple).
This is pretty cool. Can I interact with the switch directly? Can I use a little magnet to trip the switch on an iPad? Or a mac? What about iPhones, do those have hardware disconnects too?
I think this is a positive thing and like the idea of being protected even if the machine is compromised. However I would still prefer the convenience of a switch in addition to this.
Hold on. How is this hardware? Is there a physical button/hinge that is triggered? If so, the chip shouldn't matter.<p>Or is this some piece of logic emebedded in the chip itself or the firmware of some other component, which makes this solution a software one.
"The camera is not disconnected in hardware, because its field of view is completely obstructed with the lid closed".<p>How long until someone realizes audio data can be extracted by from the noise generated by a camera in the dark?