No natural person willingly enters a contract for binding arbitration; we only do so because there is no other choice.<p>I worked at my previous job for five years when they asked me to sign a contract for binding arbitration. Of course I signed it, not because I was enthusiastic about the prospect of fake judges hired by the company, but because the other implicit option was looking for a new job in an “at will” state.
> "Tesla increased its leverage by not telling Ms. Barraza about the arbitration provision until she had already accepted a verbal offer and quit her other job."<p>I've been saying for years that I don't see how contracts like that are enforceable.
> Tesla Employment Arbitration Agreement Substantively Unconscionable<p>I didn't know that "procedurally unconscionable" was a legal term, but apparently it means that one party didn't freely agree to the contract due to inequality or unfairness in the contract process, perhaps due to relative bargaining power or expertise, so the contract (or perhaps one or more of its provisions in the case of substantive unconscionability) is void.<p>This would seem (to me at least) to apply to the way most employment contracts and agreements are handled. Moreover, many employment contract terms would seem to fall under substantive unconscionability.
Most important part, IMHO:<p>> Barraza's filing also said Tesla's arbitration provision is unfair because it has a carve-out that lets Tesla sue employees for "intellectual property, confidentiality, and anti-competition claims." Multiple courts "have held that a one-sided carve-out from arbitration for the employer's claims, as in Tesla's arbitration provision here, is unconscionable," the filing said.<p>> Kaus agreed, finding that "Tesla has reserved its right to go to court for the claims it is likely to have and has relegated Barraza to arbitration for her likely claims," and that "the agreement is substantively unconscionable for lack of mutuality."