Skimming this, I was interested whether Popper tried to do any work in the logic of Quantum Theory, and yes he did: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Popper%27s_experiment" rel="nofollow">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Popper%27s_experiment</a><p>While I also advocate a more realist/Bohm-like theory above standard statistical "interpretations", I <i>would</i> differ with Popper in that I find the principle of non-locality to be just fine indeed. My own "theory of everything" operates under the assumption that the fundamental objects of reality are universally defined (ie, over the entire mathematical domain that cosmologists call "the universe"). The big question then becomes how such spread out objects can appear to us a tiny things like hydrogen atoms and electrons. I think the geometric paradigm of Conformal Field Theory is the way to think about that question. Things start entering into the domain of String Theory at that point.
With the risk of being unpopular I have to admit I have found what I've read of Popper to be seriously overrated. So far I have gone through The Open Society... and the better part of The Logic of Scientific Discovery.<p>Open Society to me read mostly like a critique of the political philosophy of Plato, Hegel and Marx, with brief mentions of what the open society is actually supposed to be (I recall some mentions of social engineering and other such things). At best it felt like a grounding for the currently dominant neo-liberal social order.<p>The Logic... on the other hand does seem to bring novel content, but I feel the core of his endeavor is hopeless. Science definitely doesn't and can't work in a perfectly coherent algorithmic way. Science is a human social process that can't be subjected to a strict methodology. On this front I think Lakatos or even Kuhn are much closer to how things can/do work.
(I like mathematical logic).<p>Continental philosophy eschews formal logic and focuses more on literature and the arts as the source of philosophical truth. Some insights from Emmanuel Kant are used to justify this ([1]). Can someone explain this stance better than [1] does?<p><i>While there has been a great deal of
sympathetic interest among analytic philosophers in the idea that philosophy should be
continuous in method and subject-matter with the natural sciences -- what is commonly
referred to as "positivism" -- Continental philosophy has generally dismissed such ideas as no
more than a reversion to a pre-Kantian conception of the philosophical enterprise.</i><p>[1] - <a href="https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/michaelrosen/files/continental_philosophy_from_hegel.pdf" rel="nofollow">https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/michaelrosen/files/contine...</a>