[Disclaimer] We are a paying Slack Customer.<p>There's a security incident and it seems like Slack is trying to keep it under wraps by only sending emails to affected accounts.<p>I've verified the email by all means (SPF/DKIM/DMARC) and it's legit:<p># Security notice from Slack regarding shared invitation links<p>We’re writing to let you know about a bug we recently discovered and fixed in Slack’s shared invite link functionality. This feature allows users with the proper permissions to create a link that will allow anyone to join your Slack workspace; it is an alternative to inviting people one-by-one via email to become workspace members. You are receiving this email because one or more members of your workspace created and/or revoked one of these links for your workspace between 17 April 2017 and 17 July 2022. We’ll go into detail about this security issue below.<p>Important things first, though: We have no reason to believe that anyone was able to obtain plaintext passwords for users in your workspace because of this vulnerability. However, for the sake of caution, we have reset impacted users’ Slack passwords. They will need to set a new Slack password before they can log in again. A list of impacted users is below.<p><pre><code> [REDACTED]
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Now, for some technical details – feel free to skip the next two paragraphs if that doesn’t interest you. When you’re connected to Slack, we keep your client updated using a piece of technology called a websocket. This is an always-open stream of behind-the-scenes information, specific to just you and your account, that we use to push new information to your Slack client. When a new message is posted, a new file is uploaded, a new emoji reaction is added or a new teammate joins, all of this information (plus much more!) is sent to you over a websocket. Data streamed from Slack’s servers over the websocket is processed by the Slack client apps, but often hidden from the user's view.<p>One of the hidden events we send over the websocket is a notice that a shared invite link was created or revoked. The bug we discovered was in this invite link event: along with the information about the shared invite link, we included the hashed password of the user who created or revoked the link. This information was sent over the websocket to all users of the workspace who were currently connected to Slack. The hash of a password is not the same as the password itself; it is a cryptographic technique to store data in a way that is secure, but not reversible. In other words, it is practically infeasible for your password to be derived from the hash, and no one can use the hash to log in as you. We use a technique called salting to further protect these hashes. Hashed passwords are secure, but not perfect – they are still subject to being reversed via brute force – which is why we’ve chosen to reset the passwords of everyone affected.<p>When your users reset their passwords we recommend selecting a complex and unique password. This is easiest to do by using a password manager to help generate and store strong, unique passwords for every service.<p>If you have additional questions, or if you need our help as you investigate this issue, you can reply to this message or email us feedback@slack.com.<p>We know that the security of your data is important. We deeply regret this issue and its impact on your organisation.<p>Sincerely,
The team at Slack