This is an issue only the state can prevent. This should be treated like robbing a bank, wire fraud, or any other such crime.<p>A browser add on won’t end this, jail time might.
I was interested in an overview of how the attack works, here's a copy / paste summary of a simplified example from the PDF:<p>> For this toy example, assume a browser vendor wants to
improve performance by only allowing one video element
to be loaded at a time, across all sites. If a video is currently
playing on any page, the site will receive an error if it tries to
play a new video.
Algorithm 1 presents a toy algorithm where by two colluding sites can trivially transform this optimization choice into
a cross-site tracking mechanism.<p>And later some examples of actual methods:<p>> We were
able to use the relatively large WebSockets connection pool
in Chromium- and Gecko-based browsers to conduct “poolparty” attacks. Safari’s WebSockets implementation was not
exploitable, since WebKit does not restrict how many WebSocket connections can be opened simultaneously. Safari’s
implementation of the SSE API, though, was previously exploitable before they fixed it. (Gecko’s implementation of the
SSE API was not exploitable).
Firefox alone was vulnerable to the Web Workers form of
the attack (a surprising finding given that Tor Browser uses
the same Gecko engine).