> It’s hard to avoid the idea that my confusion [...] is resolved by noting a principal–agent problem where the PE managers get paid a ton so intermediaries can then report unrealistically rosy assumptions and unrealistically calm returns. The chickens come home to roost only if long-term returns no longer beat public markets [...] But both parties involved, principal and agent, may be assuming that in ten-plus years that’ll be someone else’s problem.<p>So... because "rules are for the little people, and I've got my commission, so fuck you that's why"?
Isn’t there also a component that PE is incentivized to work for existing investors more than new investors. If they mark down an asset in a bear market and a new investor puts money in they will potentially dilute future profits for existing investors by possibly letting them in at a lower price. If the market recovers, the new investor sees all those gains. If the asset isn’t marked down, those gains are shared with existing investors (b/c the new investor had to pay above market).
If you had $10 billion in cash and had to allocate it, how much would you put in private equity? What is your incentive?<p>I see the appeal to private equity as a walled garden. Only elites get to invest in startups, and keeping the masses out keeps prices down (supply and demand). Depending on your outlook, you could say public markets are a bit of a ponzi scheme too. So dumping your private equity out onto the market with an exit lets you get in at the beginning of the scheme. Another big win.<p>The author says there are too many people in PE and the premiums are too high, but relative to public equity, I am really not sure. The author also mentions how bad the liquidity is, and that should also move prices down even further. So as far as economic opportunity it still seems like a good deal.<p>That being said, if I actually had $10 billion, I still don't think I would put more than 5% in because of how often startups fail and how bad the liquidity is.
So some investors believe in whatever PE tells them companies are valued at. The market is not out of the equation here because PE firms are competing with other forms of investment for investors money. If they are much better at valuation than public markets - good for them (and for investors). That's how they get to play make-believe.<p>When private companies eventually are sold via IPO or privately, all rosy estimates meet the harsh reality of what somebody is willing to pay and all overly rosy estimates are exposed. The reputation of the PE firm will reflect investors ROI (and they are usually pretty transparent about this).<p>Alternatively, some sort of profit sharing can yield long term profits from just holing private shares.
TL;DR:<p>Because investors like pension funds and college endowments do not want the write-offs.<p>It's in their short-term interest to pretend the make-believe valuations are real. The numbers look prettier that way.<p>They keep their fingers crossed that everything will turn out OK in the end.
PE shops get paid based on their assets under management (AUM).<p>If they write down their investments, their AUM drops, and with that the fees they charge.