Interesting story. I wonder about this “technical tool” put on servers to bypass encryption. Surely encryption and decryption occurs on the user side only. Sounds more like the company owners were asked to either:
(1) load software to record data on phones before encrypted or
(2) have a universal-type private key to decrypt everything. But maybe I don’t understand?<p>Perhaps an important note is from a Vice article that I found:
“..encrypted messaging programs which route messages through the firm's own servers”. If the messages are encrypted on the device then why would you need to send them via the firm’s servers? Maybe it prevents traffic monitoring or something? Sounds more like copy and decrypt.<p>Also a phone which is obviously only for criminal use does not seem smart - for the same price one could buy a new phone, sim, and popular encryption apps every month. Although a “care-free” solution for criminals is probably appealing.
An AP reporter (article below) opts to help bolster LEO's anti-encryption goals by parroting LEO PR without meaningful analysis and then goes one step further. The article says LEO cracked encrypted devices, falsely implying the handsets themselves were compromised in bulk (a power that LEO dream of having) - while info about the actual infiltration (of the EuroChat comms server) is omitted.<p>refs: <a href="https://apnews.com/article/encrypted-phones-crime-encrochat-drugs-arrests-3ccc15ef095c201eb9fe55837bfdd886" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://apnews.com/article/encrypted-phones-crime-encrochat-...</a> <a href="https://archive.is/w8q81" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://archive.is/w8q81</a>
Bank robbers rob banks because that is where the money is. Law enforcement targets criminal-oriented communication channels because that is where the criminals are.<p>Unfortunately, it seems that encryption alone is a signal to law enforcement that criminals are there.