Governments seem to want to have it both ways. As new technologies are introduced they assume that capabilities and practices available to analogous predecessors must remain available to them (e.g. wire-tapping phones => undermining cryptography) but they don’t feel the same way about public benefits or rights associated with other technology that is being replaced (anonymous cash transactions => ???)<p>It also seems like there’s a tendency to relitigate battles that are lost. I assume the UK had some equivalent to the 90s crypto wars in the US where attempts to weaken and backdoor crypto by legal means were pretty decisively defeated.<p>It’s sad that precedents should only accrue to one side’s benefit.
Her television interview with the former(?) minister responsible for this abomination of a law was urgent and necessary. These legislators know what they are doing, and that it is unethical. Let Signal leave the UK market. If the people want freedom, let them take it themselves. Perhaps before this generation of young men are rounded up for another one of history's meat grinders in Ukraine, as a means to further reduce domestic resistance to the new agenda.<p>What new words can be written that would suddenly enlighten the managers of that government and deter it from its course of fully atomizing its citizens? I'd suggest the greatest service Signal could do for the people of the UK is to suspend operations in the market preemptively. Turn into the torpedo. The thing about totalitarianism is that the longer people believe they are safe from it, the deeper its roots dig in.
I fail to understand what the uk is trying to achieve with its current ubiquitous surveillance. Crime in london is rampant, theft is nearly decriminalised in some areas, and now they want to monitor what people do on the internet? Other than docile tax payers what other potential goal is there? Services are steadily degrading, cost of living is out of control, quality of life dropping. Do they just want obedience, and apathetic population and nothing else?
This is the lasting legacy of Apple’s CSAM photo scanning debacle. Apple mainstreamed the concept, demoed the dystopian tool, and legitimized the discourse of this dystopian insanity.<p>Apple executives should be ashamed of their direct role in this.
Who persuades politicians it’s a good idea for the security services to be able to scan all their messages? I am absolutely certain that the politicians have absolutely no clue what they’re being asked to implement.
For other UK citizens: <a href="https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/634725" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/634725</a>
It’s good that Whittaker is taking a stand, but it would be nice to not have to take her word for it. Reproducible builds would help, but I don’t think we have those on iOS yet?:<p><a href="https://community.signalusers.org/t/add-reproducible-builds-to-the-ios-app/20516/7" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://community.signalusers.org/t/add-reproducible-builds-...</a>
> “I think what has happened over the you know, handful of decades in which the surveillance business model has interpolated our core infrastructure — to the point that we’re surveilled in to an extent we don’t have a sense of — is that that choice has been made for us,” Whittaker said.<p>This is an honest question: did she mean to say "infiltrated", or is this usage of "interpolated" a valid one that I just don't understand? I expected a [sic] or an edit from the article.
The water flowed under this bridge 20 years ago. This whole discussion seems like it’s happening in the wrong decade.<p>The issue now is that it’s so easy to collect circumstantial information that is constantly leaked by GPS-enabled apps, searches, card purchases, clicks, cell phone tower data, etc. that governments don’t really need the actual contents of messages any more.<p>I’m still glad Signal exists, but it’s part of a very complex world of privacy and not magical armor.
I'm still banking on the hope that governments incompetence at dealing with other issues transfers to this one and delays it long enough for someone with some sense to come into office and rip it up. You'd hope that they'd at least try to deal with the cost of living crisis and the war in Ukraine first.<p>Then again, Labour and almost all the major opposition parties have been quiet on this, not really doing the job of opposition, so even with that delay I'm not sure how much will change.
It's a strange thing, today's world. There exists, right now, a realized <i>panopticon in suspension</i>. The only reason we don't have one is that we don't want one.<p>Sometimes I think that politicians wait for a time when weighty things are on the table to erode our rights. Who is going to be a one-issue voter for something barely understood? And yet, in terms of governance, what issue is more important than this?
I personally won't use Signal because "Requires my phone number?" = Nope.<p>But good on her for sticking with her principles.<p>I did decide to use Session as a result of this bill, though, since that routes through a Tor-like system.
Perhaps the proponents of this can demonstrate how it works and make sure all their communications are scanned and sent to a "trusted party".
What does exit the UK market mean here though?<p>Presumably that it won't appear in the Apple App Store or Google Play?<p>Presumably that's more of an issue for the iOS ecosystem... But for android you just switch from using play to FDroid or an APK, right?<p>I presume a sufficiently irked UK wouldn't be able to do anything more, as Signal already as ways of circumventing traffic blocking within specific states?<p>Doesn't this just stop less motivated or technical folk getting signal... But for anyone motivated, or with nefarious intent, I don't see how this prevents anything the bill targets as a harm.
Hasn’t Apple already shown it’s possible to add another party silently to an encrypted exchange?<p>> Passwords: Users can now create a group to share a set of passwords. Everyone in a group can add and edit passwords to keep them up to date, and since sharing is through iCloud Keychain, it’s end-to-end encrypted.<p>So there goes the backdoor encryption argument, it’s possible to add another member to a group of people with on device access?
Related post from 10 days ago which goes into more depth on this: <a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=36596610">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=36596610</a><p>TL;DR: UK government wants to degrade public's right to privacy / encryption under the guise of "but think of the children!"
I wonder if the Signal app would be automatically uninstalled from existing iOS and Android devices?<p>Hopefully the signal ban will demonstrate to enough people that they don't really own the phone in their pocket - if they don't control what's on it, they are just renting it.
I'll post a comment which will probably not be that popular, I don't trust signal... I'll risk going conspiracy theorist here but to me it's just a govt backed/cia backed alternative to telegram when telegram started gaining heavy ground
The government could deem the measure is for national security. So far, has there been a case against the government in court for “unnecessary national security”?
Leave the UK and never come back. I don't know why more tech companies not do this when a government gets uppity about what it thinks they can and cannot do.
I've always wondered why politicians in America take similar stances (outside of a few like Rand Paul). Even a wild card like Trump should see how unpopular some of these policies are. Are the intelligence agencies really that influential?
E2E apps and fully encrypted phones prevent the police from executing legitimate search warrants. This has never been the case with traditional communication mechanisms, e.g. phones, mail.<p>I agree that privacy is important, but it's not absolute, by law. So what we're saying is E2E apps are more important than current law we have, and we want to invalidate the ability of the police to investigate crime.<p>How can that make sense?
> “You cannot create a back door that only the good guys can go through,”<p>Alright, technical argument here. This is false and tech talking heads are spreading this lie for ideological reasons.<p>You don't need to backdoor the protocol, just the specific targeted client.<p>Now, if Signal said this is unfair because competitors won't also backdoor their app then I am with them. What the UK should probably have done is to force phone makers as opposed to app makers to facilitate a backdoor.<p>Signal can scan messages before encryption and report to the authorities just fine. Whatever the UK government desires, Signal should accept it as the will of the UK people, especially given that politicians' stance on this has been public and endured election cycles.<p>I do get their stance, people will stop using them if they cave in and the UK gov should know that as well.<p>I don't know UK law but dragnet surveillance is illegal in the US but targeted warrantful requests to backdoor apps is lawful.