This sort of big-picture military incompetence has a rather long history:<p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shell_Crisis_of_1915" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shell_Crisis_of_1915</a><p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_14_torpedo#Supply_and_production" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_14_torpedo#Supply_and_pro...</a><p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_services_and_supply_in_the_Siegfried_Line_campaign#Shortages" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_services_and_supply_i...</a><p>Etc. etc. etc...
Normally I'd be deep into Hanlon's law and things, but the assumption there hasn't been a conversation about ramping up supply is faulty. I am sure there has been and it's been fraught because just like during mask times, manufacturers want guarantees of income and investing in the supply chain stocks and labour and production and logistics incurs costs up-front. In the mask case, the domestic suppliers said "we used to make this stuff but you went least cost and we lost money on the capex, so tell me why I should be fooled twice, which is more fool me"<p>I think that seeing the bottom of the barrel is euphemistic for "guys, we really have to settle this contract" -not "there are no more shells"