What’s interesting to me is that they are using the analogy with the actual red-cross like that automatically makes digital resources with the emblem entitled to protection in the same way that buildings and vehicles are. In other words, they want to suggest this is a simple extension of the meaning agreed to by States Parties to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. But it’s not a simple extension. Like, this is the sort of thing that you would need to include in an Additional Protocol in order for it to be binding, because it seems to me to represent a substantive extension of the original meaning and scope of the emblem affixed in meatspace.
For more technical details, here is the actual spec: <a href="https://github.com/adem-wg/adem-spec">https://github.com/adem-wg/adem-spec</a><p>If you are a nation state hacker, you can also install the convenient chrome extension which will tell you if you are allowed to hack a website or not: <a href="https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/adem-dns-checker/ikjidcfbmgnajlnngicipbbekcdflcoi" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/adem-dns-checker/ik...</a>
One of the major reasons humanitarian organisations are not attacked or even protected is because generally they provide benefits impartially, officially or otherwise. This makes attacking them "spitting into the well" and risk not only depriving yourself of the benefits but also earning yourself enemies from all sides.<p>I don't believe this dynamic exists online, for one, the belligerents are often in the shadows and don't depend or rely on any "community" or locality that might be benefiting from humanitarian work.<p>The only benefit this digital certificate might provide is prosecution grounds for harsher punishments, which isn't useless, but far from being a red cross or lion.
I bet the same people behind this would take <a href="https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3514.txt" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3514.txt</a> seriously.
My goodness, what a charade!<p>> In other words, hacker software needs to automatically load and read the emblem, so it can recognise that it is accessing a system belonging to an organisation that is protected by international humanitarian law. And that needs to happen during the software’s first reconnaissance, before it does any damage to the system.<p>Hackers are going to look up the emblem "protected by international humanitarian law".<p>> Another key requirement is for the digital emblem to be managed in a decentralised way rather than by a central authority. States that are committed to international humanitarian law should be able to verify that a certain digital infrastructure on their territory is entitled to protection and therefore bears an emblem.<p>And when they say <i>decentralised</i>, they mean <i>centralised</i>: states "should be able to verify that a certain digital infrastructure".<p>PS Felix <i>Linker</i> is defining a new protocol for hackers to anonymously check whether infrastructure can be attacked... The theatre of war!
The nature of criminal hackers is not to care about this. If it has value (financial or ideological) they will target it. Often the point is to send a message. I’m not sure they care not to attack the red cross. Also, cybercrime is one way countries try to act in the shadows. The point is to not be discovered so they can do things that are not allowed by international law. Why could they respect this if people can only accuse them and not prove it? Even when there are mountains of evidence, they still say it wasn’t us…or simply remain quiet. Did any country come forward on the pipeline attack?
I wasn't aware there was international law pertaining to not hacking medical facilities in the same way there is law pertaining to not bombing them.