Recent, related, and cited:<p><i>Is Tor still safe to use?</i> - <a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41583847">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41583847</a> - Sept 2024 (562 comments)
I have suspected Tor has been busted for quite a long time. LE is only using this power selectively for now - the last thing that they want is to scare users away lest they go and build something more secure.<p>The Nym mixnet[0] seems promising but it's still new and unproven.<p>I had an idea a while back to make traffic analysis more difficult by building circuits distributed across adversarial countries. Would like to hear thoughts on it.[1]<p>[0]: <a href="https://nymtech.net/about/mixnet" rel="nofollow">https://nymtech.net/about/mixnet</a><p>[1]: <a href="https://cedwards.xyz/adversarial-routing/" rel="nofollow">https://cedwards.xyz/adversarial-routing/</a>
One advantage of imperfect privacy solutions like Tor is they force authorities to invest if they want to snoop. In the before times if soneone wanted to read your mail they'd need to at least convince a judge and then spend manpower interecepting the envelopes, today they can just ping google for a bcc.
The dark network of the future will be an onion-routed Hyphanet/Freenet, with monthly "bandwidth quotas" that make links communicate uniformly at X GB/hr regardless of traffic (padding when there is none) until the monthly quota is hit right at the end of the month. If internodal links don't vary in externally measurable ways when utilized, netflow is diminished.
It's not directly mentioned in this article, but the four deanonymized users were admins of a CSAM site with hundreds of thousands of users. If you're concerned about being targeted by law enforcement, step one is probably: don't be that.<p><a href="https://www.dw.com/de/darknet-missbrauchsplattform-boystown-zerschlagen/a-57416124" rel="nofollow">https://www.dw.com/de/darknet-missbrauchsplattform-boystown-...</a><p><a href="https://www.sueddeutsche.de/panorama/kindesmissbrauch-boystown-darknet-frankfurt-prozess-1.5710224" rel="nofollow">https://www.sueddeutsche.de/panorama/kindesmissbrauch-boysto...</a>
Split EntryGuard should help, means you connect to multiple of them instead of one, and your data is split between them then it gets to Exit through multiple paths (Middle Nodes) and there it is reconstructed to one data stream. How about that?
Connecting through multiple EntryGuards should help in this situation, Tor should split data transfer to many smaller ones travelling through different paths (Entry+Midddle) and then get it reconstructed to one stream at ExitNode.
Are there any projects that generates random traffic? Like a website where you have it open it keeps sending <i>random</i> traffic. It will make traffic analysis very hard.