SnipVex clipjacking wallets is almost beside the point, the real failure is a printer vendor treating software like a side gig. Printer and hardware companies get a pass on basic infosec hygiene that would be unacceptable for open source maintainers.<p>until that changes, airgap your weird hardware setups I guess<p>Also this is a perfect storm for lateral movement. USB-borne worms still work frighteningly well in small biz environments, especially ones with no centralized IT and people plugging printers directly into Windows desktops with admin perms. Here SnipVex is just a cherry on top-a nice, opportunistic payload for the growing class of infostealers targeting crypto wallets
> While some redditors speculate that the trojan was planted on purpose, there is no evidence to support this claim. Outdated malware with an inactive command-and-control server is not advantageous for any attacker nor does superinfection make sense for this scenario. A far more plausible explanation points to the absence or failure of antivirus scanning on the systems used to compile and distribute the software packages. Procolored promises to improve this process, so that it cannot happen again.<p>That this system is so insecure as to be hit multiple times, I don't know how much stock anyone should put in "improved processes". This is a company who seems to have gone out of their way to create an insecure environment - probably out of some frustration, but all the same, insecure.
If Bitcoin wallets would be designed properly they would ask for a second confirmation before sending 100k USD.<p>This may be the main thing to fix here, as it's very plausible that hacks happen again and again... by design.<p>Today it's an infected printer, tomorrow it will be a game on Steam.