This is a well-known and important aspect of keeping data classified. Just because classified information is leaked does not mean that people with clearance can treat it as unclassified. There is lots of bogus "classified" information out there, and an excellent way to limit the harm of leaked truly classified info (which is unavoidable) is to make it indistinguishable from bogus info. And the way to do this is to not confirm or deny that it is legitimate.<p>Yes, this means people with clearance will sometimes have to sound silly when it becomes overwhelmingly clear that the info is legitimate. But the alternative is for individuals with clearance to effectively declassify information unilaterally, which would be disastrous. Instead, information is only declassified by folks at the top.<p>This is just the basic idea I gathered from working near labs doing classified research. Some of the explanations for seemingly bizarre behavior concerning classified information gets even deeper into the "because he'll think that she'll think that he'll think...." rabbit hole. Someone who actually has clearance can probably speak on this much more usefully than I can.
I was going to suggest that isn't the fact this information can now be seen by the public mean it is by definition unclassified but I see there are different levels of classification.<p>I was under the impression "classified" meant secret and the two words were interchangeable. If I can trust Wikipedia it shows there are five classes information can Top Secret, Secret, Confidential, Restricted, Unclassified.<p>Now I understand that if a document is classed as Secret it's still Secret even though it's leaked to the public, the information doesn't change just because more people can view it.<p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classified_information#Classification_levels" rel="nofollow">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classified_information#Classif...</a>
Actually seems quite reasonable, wouldn't want the employees getting a feeling that the security rules don't apply anymore. They would be wise do declassify the leaked documents, what's done is done and trying to pretend otherwise will only server to delegitimatize the rules.
Here's the deal. Most classified information is segmented. Say I want to build a encrypting radio. I may have one team build the encrypting part, but they don't know it is for a radio. I have a second team build a radio, but they don't know an encrypting part is going in it (there is just a spec for a 'device' to be plugged in). If I am in the radio building team, and the encrypting info is leaked, and I read it, suddenly I know that an encrypting radio is being built, something that the average person reading the leaked info wouldn't know.<p>You don't access classified material that you are not cleared for. Period.
That's pretty much what my company told me. They went so far as to block any access to sites that even mentioned NSA or terms associated with whistle blowing.
It's more like an attempt to not let other classified information inadvertently leak because people get careless when they know the information is out in the open.<p>I would encourage them they still have something to hide apparently :D