<p><pre><code> > We will also be adding support for something no other provider is currently offering called Elliptic Curve Cryptographic security, with both 256bit and 521bit curves.
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Any particular reason to not offer 384bit as well?<p>ps. likely a typo: 521 should be 512?<p>edit: Nope. 521 is correct[1]. thanks @mtoledo<p>[1]: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_curve_cryptography#cite_note-24" rel="nofollow">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_curve_cryptography#ci...</a>
If I were the NSA, I would run these VPN services.<p>They provide a perfect honeypot to gather the "illegal" web users or those with something to hide, in one place.
If I was the NSA I'd force/put some piece of network hardware that mirrored all VPN traffic exiting PIA's endpoints. I would assume that the US, UK and DE endpoints might be monitored without PIA's knowledge (unless they own the data centre and/or upstream provider?).<p>Then it is fairly simple to start pattern matching the unencrypted traffic exiting your endpoints by matching HTTP headers for each client. Then all they would need is for a VPN user to acces a website that leaks the user's identity and you can back match their previous traffic.<p>For example, you search for information on "how to make a bomb" via the VPN. Your browser sends the the HTTP headers, Accept-Language set to Accept-Language: ar-YE,en-US,fr-FR,de-DE;q=0.5 and a user agent of Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; Win64; x64; rv:21.0.0) Gecko/20121011 Firefox/21.0.0. Those HTTP headers aren't unique, but they vastly narrow the search scope.<p>Now as that user you visit your Facebook page, and those same matching HTTP headers are passed. Boom, you've just leaked your true identity.
This is somewhat of a red herring. It's more feasible for the NSA to attack from a side channel, and with their influence that's what they've been doing. No doubt they may have optimized some attacks on already previously weakened ciphers (such as RC4), but there's so many other links to strike.