> Therefore, we assume that the bank faithfully executes the<p>> protocol and only makes observations that are part of that<p>> protocol. In particular, he does not act as an onion<p>> router or as a client, only observes messages that are<p>> sent to him, and does not collude with the network<p>> adversary.<p>"Not collude" part worries me. Can anyone smart enough comment on this?
No, a better way is to do outreach to the people who have the resources to contribute. I can think of an important group, represented by HN: web site consultants and web companies that may have excess hosting resources at the end of the month, every month.<p>Essentially Tor could be that thing you run on your servers before you launch; and if you launched, then before you get big. Think of it as a kind of load test for your young, under-used infrastructure.<p>ADD: How to install tor server:<p><pre><code> https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-relay-debian.html.en
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I'm doing it right now...But I'm realizing that I really need better bandwidth constraints. I want to be able to tell Tor to limit itself by connection count, bandwidth, and memory consumption.<p>ADD: Holy cow, they really want you to lock down your Tor box:<p><pre><code> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/OperationalSecurity
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Anyone know why they expect a box running a tor relay to be locked down so tightly?