Let's please write the replacement in a language that has some built-in safety guarantees, and ideally some features supporting correctness proofs.<p>Haskell comes to mind. If we want to avoid a runtime, let's go for a language like Rust, which also has strong safety guarantees and lots of Haskell/ML-inspired features that help improve both safety and readability (advanced pattern matching, Options, immutability guarantees, etc.)<p>Both of these languages are sufficiently fast to develop high-performance crypto frameworks, and both have good FFIs for calling optimized C code if necessary.
Forgive me, but I feel like laughing.
No one helped the project. No one funded the project.
No one cared until the hearthbleed bug. No one even looked at the damned code. But everyone feels entitled to comment on how shitty OpenSSL is, NOW.
This is getting ridiculous.
If I recall correctly, ACM is a branch of IEEE which famously stored 100k user names and passwords in plain text on an FTP server.<p><a href="http://ieeelog.dragusin.ro/init/default/log" rel="nofollow">http://ieeelog.dragusin.ro/init/default/log</a>
Can we downvote submissions or something? Because this is absolute rubbish.<p>There may be an average of 1 error per 1000 lines of code, but saying that there are 299 remaining bugs in OpenSSL is like saying there are sixteen thousand vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel. All software is backdoored if you go by this standard. There would be no such thing as security anymore. So the rule is flawed.<p>Then another third of the post goes on to complain about the excessive list of CAs in our browser. How does this have <i>anything</i> to do with OpenSSL? What cryptographic breakthrough do you propose we use instead?<p>Until then, I suppose you just shut up and try to work on the OpenSSL code, or an alternative library, instead of writing blogposts.