The top-voted comment for the same piece in the Economist explores the rent-seeking behavior of SF landlords, the origins and the conditions that gave rise to Prop 13 in the first place and proposes a set of (albeit, I admit, a bit far-fetched) solutions:<p><pre><code> I am one of these SF oligarchs, and I benefit from high rents of
both types. Nevertheless, I have long called for an end to the
rent-seeking. To me, the problem started when the boomers of
old voted themselves two enormous market distortions over 30 years ago.
Proposition 13 was sold as a means of keeping granny in her home,
but it does not particularly benefit the elderly, the sick, or the
needy. It benefits land owning incumbents (like me) at the expense
of everyone else. Kill it. Start with the grotesque subsidy for
commercial property, and then phase out the residential subsidy.
Not to be outdone, SF renters voted themselves a rent control
ordinance. This also does not particularly benefit the elderly, the
sick, or the needy. Like Prop 13, it benefits one thing only -
incumbency. I know fairly wealthy 50-somethings who have rented
apartments for decades, and now pay a third or a quarter of market
rates thanks to rent control. They keep these now as pied-a-terres,
while they own comfortable homes in Marin or the wine country. For
each one of these old renters, there are ten smart ambitious young
people desperate to contribute new creativity and energy into the
community if they could just find a room. Only the wealthiest of
these can compete for the few remaining market rate units, and they
must pay plenty of both kinds of rent, to people like me.
This may be seem like daydreaming, but I hope Governor Brown and SF
can someday create a grand bargain. Kill Prop 13 AND rent control
with the stroke of a pen.
As for overall supply and demand, I would support a state law that creates
1 - an estimate of statewide population growth
2 - a requirement that every municipality periodically rezone to
accommodate a portion of that growth proportional to its current
size; or
3 - pay another municipality to take its share
This would create something like a reverse cap and trade system to
manage the supposed externalities of growth. This way, NIMBY cities
would have to pay growth-friendly cities, and NIMBY voters would have to
pay for their selfish rent-seeking behavior. Who knows? There might even
be less of it. [1]
</code></pre>
[1] <a href="http://www.economist.com/comment/2358176#comment-2358176" rel="nofollow">http://www.economist.com/comment/2358176#comment-2358176</a>