1b:I[3821,["874","static/chunks/874-5853b36c417a5f43.js","598","static/chunks/598-8e8b350c69b61725.js","735","static/chunks/735-5d5145bb0f79dc16.js","881","static/chunks/881-64080935572a77c4.js","671","static/chunks/app/%5Blocale%5D/submitted/page-9972e6b84e2d7c4f.js"],"default"] 1c:T71b,I've been a long-time user of KeePass. I inspected its 2.x .NET source code today and quickly noticed the following issues which I find quite concerning:

The kdbx database is encrypted with AES in CBC/PKCS7 mode without proper authentication. HMAC is nowhere to be found in the code, other than when used for sha1-totp. There are SHA2 hashes that seem to guard the integrity of ciphertext, while these might catch a typical file corruption they will not prevent malicious tampering. Even if the hashes are used prior to encryption, that's still MtE - not EtM.

KeePass likely does not have an online threat model, so attacks like Padding-Oracle might not be applicable, but a lack of AEAD is IMHO highly concerning because it indicates that the author(s) are winging it when it comes to doing crypto right.

Byte array comparisons are done with this function from MemUtil.cs:

		public static bool ArraysEqual(byte[] x, byte[] y)
		{
			// Return false if one of them is null (not comparable)!
			if((x == null) || (y == null)) { Debug.Assert(false); return false; }

			if(x.Length != y.Length) return false;

			for(int i = 0; i < x.Length; ++i)
			{
				if(x[i] != y[i]) return false;
			}

			return true;
		}

There are many other questionable patterns, code smells, and "I-invented-it" approaches that indicate a non-expert .NET programming skill. They can't even implement a Singleton correctly (see CryptoRandom.cs).

Has anyone ever done a security audit of KeePass 2.x or does everyone just believe that it's "good enough"?

P.S. None of this detracts from the fact that KeePass is a very useful, free utility with a lot of effort put into it. I thank a

Submissions by sdrapkin

KeePass – questionable security

KeePass – questionable security