This is very cool. Integrations look slick. Folks are understandably hyped—the potential for agents doing "deep research-style" work across broad data sources is real.<p>But the thread's security concerns—permissions, data protection, trust—are dead on. There is also a major authN/Z gap, especially for orgs that want MCP to access internal tools, not just curated SaaS.<p>Pushing complex auth logic (OAuth scopes, policy rules) into every MCP tool feels backwards.<p>* Access-control sprawl. Each tool reinvents security. Audits get messy fast.<p>* Static scopes vs. agent drift. Agents chain calls in ways no upfront scope list can predict. We need per-call, context checks.<p>* Zero-Trust principles mismatch. Central policy enforcement is the point. Fragmenting it kills visibility and consistency.<p>We already see the cost of fragmented auth: supply-chain hits and credential reuse blowing up multiple tenants. Agents only raise the stakes.<p>I think a better path (and in one in full disclosure, we're actively working on at Pomerium ) is to have:<p>* One single access point in front of all MCP resources.<p>* Single sign-on once, then short-lived signed claims flow downstream..<p>* AuthN separated from AuthZ with a centralized policy engine that evaluates every request, deny-by-default. Evaluation in both directions with hooks for DLP.<p>* Unified management, telemetry, audit log and policy surface.<p>I’m really excited about what MCP is putting us in the direction of being able to do with agents.<p>But without a higher level way to secure and manage the access, I’m afraid we’ll spend years patching holes tool by tool.