I think this article is great, but something did stand out for me.<p>I'm a huge supporter of universal end-to-end encryption, but Feinstein's point is making me feel some cognitive dissonance:<p>>"I think with a court order, with good justification, all of that can be prevented."<p>There <i>are</i> cases where I would want law enforcement to be able to read encrypted communications in an emergency situation, with a valid court order. If someone is being held hostage, for example. Of course I don't want intelligence agencies having this same access; just very specific requests during exigent circumstances, with judge approval. A real judge in a real court, not a secret FISA court.<p>But to do that you need some kind of key escrow already set up with the government, and if you have that, there's nothing stopping law enforcement and intelligent agencies from spying on what they want when they want.<p>Right now this isn't a huge problem since a lot of people still communicate in plaintext, or things that are encrypted but logged/intercepted by a central location (Skype). But eventually more and more things will move to end-to-end encryption.<p>What is the right way to handle this?