I do believe that the U.S. can't "ban encryption", any more than it could "ban mathematics".<p>That doesn't mean the intelligence value to legally enforced backdoors in popular US-created or US-marketed products isn't significant.<p>For one thing, your target might not be sophisticated or suspicious enough to avoid these products, or they may be communicating with folks who aren't (for example, if you're studying recruitment).<p>For another, requiring anyone desiring to hide their communication to eschew popular products itself provides a signal that may be of interest. And a diversity of smaller encrypted products may end up being more vulnerable to subversion and exploitation, vs. widely used, deeply studied systems.<p>I am not arguing that this value is worth the massive privacy and civil liberties tradeoff of giving the government access to products like iMessage. But it's not, I think, as simple as saying, "the bad guys will just switch to using other tools".