The problem here was already known before the publication of the paper even though the paper was still a clever attack. Most of security research, including high-assurance software, was largely ignoring attacks on hardware. There was a subfield growing that didn't trust the RAM, disk, peripherals, etc. These designs drew a boundary at the ASIC or SOC level where anything tampering outside was protected with crypto, PUF's, etc. The first I saw was Aegis:<p><a href="https://people.csail.mit.edu/devadas/pubs/aegis-istr-august6-2005.pdf" rel="nofollow">https://people.csail.mit.edu/devadas/pubs/aegis-istr-august6...</a><p>Joshua Edmison's dissertation lists a number of others along with his own, interesting scheme:<p><a href="https://theses.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-10112006-204811/unrestricted/edmison_joshua_dissertation.pdf" rel="nofollow">https://theses.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-10112006-2048...</a><p>Nobody has learned anything different since for the fundamentals. The fundamentals are still to use authenticated crypto of some sort on RAM to detect attacks there to fail safe at worst. Also, use special IO/MMU's, SOC mechanisms, and software protected by them to handle stuff on disks. Stopping cold boot attack is straight-forward on such architectures that don't trust RAM in the first place.<p>From there, we move into cat and mouse game of SOC attack and defense. Most of those require physical possession for more than a few minutes, though, with often destruction of the chip as a result. So, this is a significant step forward in security vs just snatching the RAM out of the system.