I appreciate how practical these tips are and I hope people will follow them.<p>I have two quarrels with this:<p>> Andy Grove was a Hungarian refugee who escaped communism [... and] encourages us to be paranoid.<p>I'm pretty sure that Grove was referring to business strategy, not communications security.<p>> Congratulations — you can now use the internet with peace of mind that it’s virtually impossible for you to be tracked.<p>Something I've seen over and over again is that Tor users tend to have a poor understanding of what Tor protects and doesn't protect. The original Tor paper said that Tor (or any technology of its kind) can't protect you against someone who can see both sides of the connection -- including just their <i>timing</i>. Sometimes, some adversaries can see both sides of a person's connection. As The Grugq and others have documented, Tor users like Eldo Kim and Jeremy Hammond were caught by law enforcement because someone was monitoring the home and university networks from which they connected to Tor and saw that they used Tor at exactly the same time or times as the suspects did. (In Hammond's case, recurrently, confirming law enforcement's hypothesis about his identity; in Kim's case, only once, but apparently he was the only person at the university who used Tor at that specific time.)<p>As law enforcement has <i>actually identified Tor users</i> in these cases, I think people need to understand that Tor is not magic and it protects certain things and not other things. In fact, I helped to make a chart about this a few years ago:<p><a href="https://www.eff.org/pages/tor-and-https" rel="nofollow">https://www.eff.org/pages/tor-and-https</a><p>This chart was meant to show why using HTTPS is important when you use Tor, but it also points to other possible attacks (including an end-to-end timing correlation attack, represented in the chart by NSA observing the connection at two different places on the network) because many people in the picture know <i>something</i> about what the user is doing.<p>I've been a fan of Tor for many years, but I think we have to do a lot better at communicating about its limitations.