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The Many-Worlds Interpretation Has Many Problems

78 点作者 ykm超过 6 年前

18 条评论

ZhuanXia超过 6 年前
&gt;What can you do with this power to generate worlds and selves? You could become a billionaire by playing quantum Russian roulette.<p>Quantum suicide isn&#x27;t exploitable, for reasons I went over in a thread on reddit:<p>&gt;One thing about these quantum immortality (or modal realism, dust theory, etc.) arguments is they imply one should expect to end up in those proportion of worlds that have the highest measure in which &quot;you&quot; exist. And the most probable actions you should expect to remember are the highest-measure actions that leads to the perpetuation of your conscious experience.<p>&gt;In this way quantum suicide is not really exploitable, as the vast majority of &quot;your&quot; measure will be in worlds where you find quantum suicide to be unappealing. Even failed attempts will be of much smaller measure then those in which you never try. So stories like Permutation City are sort of the equivalent of stories in which magic is the result of quantum fluctuations. They don&#x27;t violate any laws of physics but they focus on such a ridiculously myopic slice of possibility space that it is a little absurd, even when you condition on the continuation of conscious experience.<p>Even if it were exploitable, this is not a reason to doubt many worlds, any more than time dilation is a reason to doubt relativity.<p>This great comment on that piece by Sengachi is a must read: <a href="http:&#x2F;&#x2F;disq.us&#x2F;p&#x2F;1wnl71q" rel="nofollow">http:&#x2F;&#x2F;disq.us&#x2F;p&#x2F;1wnl71q</a>
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wildermuthn超过 6 年前
Quantum suicide is a fascinating thought experiment. If consciousness is a property of a certain type of brain (or calculation?), then the concept of ‘’’me” is just a variation of the anthropic principle: I believe my subjective experience to be something unique, but there’s nothing unique or special about a human brain and the conscious experiences it produces.<p>So even if there are billions of worlds, there aren’t billions of “me”s out there. There are simply billions of consciousnesses which share common memories and thought patterns. Each variation would believe itself to be the true “me”, when in fact they are all wrong: there is no “me”. Just the consciousnesses that all those brains create.<p>So in quantum suicide, there is no transfer of any sort. One consciousness is simply extinguished forever. The other continues.<p>This aligns somewhat with Buddhist teachings about the illusion of “self”. I don’t believe in the supernatural, but one could consider the idea of reincarnation as merely the fact that there are not instances of consciousness, but instead manifestations of one phenomenon. Which could possibly mean that if you are a conscious being reading this comment at this moment, you can rest assured that your death will not stop “you” from continuing to experience subjective experiences as another person, in another place, at another time. You just won’t realize it, because you won’t be “you” anymore.<p>Or maybe it’s all nonsense.<p>I have a hunch there is a variation of quantum suicide that would be less lethal, but no less measurable.
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nabla9超过 6 年前
Philip Ball explores the problems that many world interpretation poses to the concepts of self and meaningfulness of life in the sense that he understands them.<p>Nothing in the article clearly points to problems in physics or even philosophy of physics in many world interpretation.<p>Makes me feel uncomfortable is not very deep argument.
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Veedrac超过 6 年前
Here&#x27;s the article in short.<p>1. &quot;Roland Omnès says the idea that every little quantum “measurement” spawns a world “gives an undue importance to the little differences generated by quantum events, as if each of them were vital to the universe.” This, he says, is contrary to what we generally learn from physics: that most of the fine details make no difference at all to what happens at larger scales.&quot;<p>2. &quot;What can it mean to say that splittings generate copies of me? In what sense are those other copies “me?”&quot; &#x2F; &quot;Consciousness relies on experience, and experience is not an instantaneous property: It takes time, not least because the brain’s neurons themselves take a few milliseconds to fire. You can’t “locate” consciousness in a universe that is frantically splitting countless times every nanosecond&quot;<p>3. &quot;You could become a billionaire by playing quantum Russian roulette. Your quantum splitter is activated while you sleep, and if the dial says Up then you’re given a billion dollars when you wake. If it shows Down then you are put to death painlessly in your sleep.&quot; &#x2F; &quot;But a committed Everettian should have no hesitation about doing so using the quantum splitter. For you can be certain, in this view, that you’ll wake up to be presented with the cash. Of course, only one of “you” wakes up at all; the others have been killed. But those other yous knew nothing of their demise. Sure, you might worry about the grief afflicted on family and friends in those other worlds. But that aside, the rational choice is to play the game.&quot;<p>4. &quot;Alice is put to sleep before the measurement is made, knowing she will be wheeled into one of two identical rooms depending on the outcome. Both rooms contain a chest. Inside one is twice her stake, while the other is empty.&quot; &#x2F; &quot;But what if Alice were to say, “The experience I will have is that I will wake up in a room containing a chest that has a 100-percent chance of being empty”? The Everettian must accept this statement as a true and rational belief too, for the initial “I” here must apply to both Alices in the future.&quot; &#x2F; &quot;In other words, Alice Before can’t use quantum mechanics to predict what will happen to her in a way that can be articulated — because there is no logical way to talk about “her” at any moment except the conscious present (which, in a frantically splitting universe, doesn’t exist).&quot;<p>Sengachi&#x27;s reply in the comments below basically summarises my reaction.
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calebh超过 6 年前
Could the anthropic principle taken into conjunction with our continued existence be used to show that the MWI is more probable?<p>Here&#x27;s the situation that I&#x27;m thinking about: it&#x27;s well known that we&#x27;ve come close to nuclear annihilation multiple times, either by accident or by tensions between the US and the USSR in the Cold War. If the MWI is correct, it is probable that a good chunk of these worlds have been reduced to ash. However, we currently find ourselves in a world where that has not happened, presumably due to the anthropic principle. Could we then give a numerical probability that MWI is correct, based on this fact?<p>I&#x27;m not a philosopher or physicist - just an interested layman.
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jhpriestley超过 6 年前
MWI seems more elegant than Copenhagen in many formulations because the problem of the relative magnitudes of the worlds is swept under the rug. If I perform a quantum coin-flip with 2&#x2F;3 possibility of heads, then it creates two worlds - but I end up in one of them twice as often - why? The only solutions I&#x27;ve seen to preserve the relative probabilities are: 1) sufficiently unlikely worlds sometimes just disappear, or 2) some kind of appeal to consciousness. These are at least as ad-hoc and hand-wavy as waveform collapse.
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noahdesu超过 6 年前
I enjoyed reading this article. But at the beginning the author has this to say about objections to the MWI that are based on feeling:<p>&gt; &quot;This objection is rightly dismissed by saying that an affront to one’s sense of propriety is no grounds for rejecting a theory. Who are we to say how the world should behave?&quot;<p>But really at the end of the article the conclusion about the problems with MWI feel similar:<p>&gt; &quot;But an idea that, when we pursue it seriously, makes that view inchoate and unspeakable doesn’t fulfill the function of science.&quot;
jblow超过 6 年前
Of course it seems weird to think of Many Worlds as somehow manufacturing universes for each fluctuation. That seems weird and wrong ... because it probably is.<p>A better way to think of it is as the equivalent of the relativistic block universe. All these different spaces already exist in some superspace, and ‘random’ events take you from one space to a neighboring one. Nothing is manufactured.
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rladd超过 6 年前
Unless I&#x27;m missing it, his argument about why MWI is untenable in terms of physics is:<p>- If the universe splits with each measurement (or interaction), then every possible outcome does occur<p>- Therefore nothing could be predicted based on probabilities, and that proves MWI is wrong<p>This seems to have a few logical errors:<p>Just because everything that can happen does, in MWI, happen in at least one universe, that doesn&#x27;t mean that the probability of each outcome is identical.<p>Probabilities still apply: higher probability outcomes mean that one is more likely to find one&#x27;s self in a universe in which that outcome takes place.<p>In this way of describing things, it&#x27;s still a very low (but non-zero!) probability that all the air in your room will move to the corner, leaving you to suffocate in a vacuum. But the way we state it would be, &quot;it&#x27;s a very low probability that you will find yourself in one of the universes in which this happens&quot;.
n4r9超过 6 年前
Philip Ball has previously written very similar articles on his objections to Many Worlds:<p><a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;aeon.co&#x2F;essays&#x2F;is-the-many-worlds-hypothesis-just-a-fantasy" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;aeon.co&#x2F;essays&#x2F;is-the-many-worlds-hypothesis-just-a-...</a><p>Whilst I share his frustration with how readily it is being taken up and the dogmatic glamour surrounding it, I feel like he consistently misses the primary issues with it.<p>Copy-pasting a previous comment trying to describe succinctly what I see as the central problem:<p>&gt; Although there are many versions of MWI, the general claim is that a single axiom (a unitarily evolving wavefunction) is sufficient to explain our observations of the universe. Without getting into what it means to &quot;explain&quot; something, it seems fair to demand that a sufficiently intelligent agent with no prior knowledge of our physics should be able to predict what the theory says about their future observations. However no one would be able to make any experimental predictions based on the above axiom. There&#x27;s nothing there to suggest that if the agent becomes entangled with a quantum system then they would only experience a single branch of the entanglement. Even if you add that in, there&#x27;s nothing to suggest which branch the agent will experience (this is roughly the preferred basis problem). Even if you add that in, there&#x27;s nothing to suggest with what probability the agent will experience that branch.<p>&gt; You could always add in the above as additional axioms. You could postulate some physical content to the Born-rule, or to something weaker from which to deduce the Born rule. But this would break the illusion that MWI requires fewer axioms. Instead, a great deal of energy has been expended into deducing the Born rule purely from that single axiom. There have been many very clever attempts at this, but none convincing enough to settle the matter.<p>If you&#x27;re interested in reading more, Adrian Kent has written some fairly thorough critiques on arxiv:<p><a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;arxiv.org&#x2F;abs&#x2F;0905.0624" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;arxiv.org&#x2F;abs&#x2F;0905.0624</a>
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trainingaccount超过 6 年前
Some counterpoints:<p><a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.hedweb.com&#x2F;manworld.htm" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.hedweb.com&#x2F;manworld.htm</a><p><a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.lesswrong.com&#x2F;posts&#x2F;9cgBF6BQ2TRB3Hy4E&#x2F;and-the-winner-is-many-worlds" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.lesswrong.com&#x2F;posts&#x2F;9cgBF6BQ2TRB3Hy4E&#x2F;and-the-wi...</a>
JProthero超过 6 年前
The Many-Worlds Interpretation is seriously mischaracterised in the summary at the top of the article (presumably not written by Ball himself) when it says this:<p>&quot;<i>The idea that the universe splits into multiple realities with every measurement has become an increasingly popular proposed solution to the mysteries of quantum mechanics.</i>&quot;<p>This is a misrepresentation of what the Many-Worlds Interpretation actually suggests, and it is contradicted in the article itself by Ball:<p>&quot;<i>In effect, this implies that the entire universe is described by a gigantic wave function that contains within it all possible realities. This “universal wave function,” as Everett called it in his thesis, begins as a combination, or superposition, of all possible states of its constituent particles. As it evolves, some of these superpositions break down, making certain realities distinct and isolated from one another. In this sense, worlds are not exactly “created” by measurements; they are just separated. This is why we shouldn’t, strictly speaking, talk of the “splitting” of worlds (even though Everett did), as though two have been produced from one. Rather, we should speak of the unraveling of two realities that were previously just possible futures of a single reality.</i>&quot;<p>The error in the summary is a common misrepresentation, and it leaves many people (including me, when I first heard of the Everett Interpretation) with the mistaken impression that the interpretation proposes some mysterious new mechanism that causes the entire universe to &#x27;split&#x27; every time a physical interaction or observation occurs. This is pretty much the opposite of what the interpretation actually suggests, since its purpose is to dispense with the significance of observation and &#x27;wavefunction collapse&#x27; in the Copenhagen Interpretation.<p>The physicist Max Tegmark (an adherent of the Everett Interpretation, who made a film[1] about Everett with Everett&#x27;s son; a sad story, as Everett was unable to make a career for himself in physics due to the unpopularity of his most famous idea) I think puts it best when he says this about the Many-Worlds Interpretation in his book, Our Mathematical Universe:<p>&quot;<i>The rumours I&#x27;d heard suggested that Everett proposed crazy-sounding stuff like parallel universes and that our Universe would split into parallel universes whenever you made an observation. Indeed, even today, many of my physics colleagues still think that this is what Everett assumed. Reading Everett&#x27;s book taught me a lesson not only in physics but also in sociology: I learned the importance of going back and checking the source material for yourself rather than relying on secondhand information. It&#x27;s not only in politics that people get misquoted, misinterpreted and misrepresented, and Everett&#x27;s Ph.D. thesis is a great example of something that, to first approximation, every-one in physics has an opinion about and almost nobody has read.[2]</i>&quot;<p>&quot;<i>The notion that at certain magic instances, reality undergoes some sort of metaphysical split into two branches that subsequently never interact isn&#x27;t only a misrepresentation of Everett&#x27;s thesis, but also inconsistent with Everett&#x27;s postulate that the wavefunction never collapses, since the subsequent developments could in principle make the branches interfere with each other.</i>&quot;<p>[1] <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;en.wikipedia.org&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;Parallel_Worlds,_Parallel_Lives" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;en.wikipedia.org&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;Parallel_Worlds,_Parallel_Live...</a><p>[2] <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www-tc.pbs.org&#x2F;wgbh&#x2F;nova&#x2F;manyworlds&#x2F;pdf&#x2F;dissertation.pdf" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www-tc.pbs.org&#x2F;wgbh&#x2F;nova&#x2F;manyworlds&#x2F;pdf&#x2F;dissertation...</a> (Everett&#x27;s original thesis)
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Upvoter33超过 6 年前
My own problem with many worlds is (a) it seems to me to require a ridiculous amount of energy and (b) what happens when two world splits occur &quot;at the same time&quot; on opposite sides of our planet? Also (c), it just doesn&#x27;t appeal to intuition, but it seems like much of physics does not :)
prmph超过 6 年前
One thing that others me about the MWI: Is the so-called &quot;set of all possibilities&quot; a well-defined set?
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ElBarto超过 6 年前
This feels a bit like JIT processing.<p>There may be a number of states possible but there is no need to &#x27;process&#x27; which one it is until that information is needed.
cleanyourroom超过 6 年前
In some universes it has no problems.
ThePhysicist超过 6 年前
This is a very philosophical &#x2F; meta-physical discussion of quantum mechanics, and not in line with our modern understanding of the measurement process. For example, there really is no sudden wave function collapse in quantum mechanics, as every measurement process can be described as a purely quantum-mechanical process that produces an apparent &quot;collapse&quot; of a wave function through entanglement and decoherence. There&#x27;s nothing magical or abrupt about it, today we can even perform quantum measurements that precisely control the amount of decoherence that is introduced to a system (see e.g. some of Irfan Siddiqi&#x27;s seminal quantum feedback experements like <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.nature.com&#x2F;articles&#x2F;nature11505" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.nature.com&#x2F;articles&#x2F;nature11505</a>, or the earlier work done in Serge Haroche&#x27;s group). Taking aside the philosophical problems that people have with &quot;pure&quot; quantum mechanics (i.e. an interpretation that does away with the second postulate of wave function collapse) it perfectly describes our experimental results.<p>The largest problem with wave function collapse (which the author only briefly skims) is that you need a way to explain how it works: Basically when the wavefunction collapses we go from a fully reversible, deterministic quantum system to an irreversible, stochastic system. At which scale is this supposed to happen? Let&#x27;s say one day we can build huge quantum computers (think billions or trillions of qubits) that we can perfectly control. We could then prepare a single qubit in a superposition state. We can entangle this qubit with the other qubits (the measurement system) and manipulate the state of the measurement system using a deterministic but highly chaotic control program. If we&#x27;d then measure the state of the single qubit (e.g. by preparing many identical systems and performing quantum state tomography) we&#x27;d find that the wave function has collapsed, i.e. there is no more coherence between the two qubit states. Now, after entangling the qubit and evolving the large system we could just reverse its deterministic evolution (as we have perfect control over it) and bring it back to the state it was in directly after entangling it with the qubit. If we then perform quantum state tomography of the qubit we should see that the coherence is back. Now, if we believe that wave function collapse is a phenomenon that occurs independently and not as an effect of the evolution of the large quantum system, we would expect to observe a loss of coherence in the qubit even after perfectly reversing the state of the large quantum system. The question is then of course: At which scale does this happen, and what is the physical theory that governs this behavior? Are one billion qubits enough to produce it? One quadrillion? To my knowledge, no one came up with even an idea of how to describe this. If someone finds a good theory for describing wave function collapse I&#x27;ll consider it as valid theory, until then I&#x27;ll stick with the &quot;many worlds&quot; interpretation, though I&#x27;d really prefer calling it &quot;plain&quot; quantum mechanics instead.
gpm超过 6 年前
&gt; This, he says, is contrary to what we generally learn from physics: that most of the fine details make no difference at all to what happens at larger scales.&quot;<p>Oh? Since when have we disproved the butterfly effect?
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