Without proof, is Huawei still a national security threat?

&gt;That’s the crux of the argument: nobody thinks Huawei is spying now. To get caught would be too dangerous. But nobody knows that it won’t spy in the future.<p>Huawei was implicated in the hack on the African Union. [1,2] Now, that hasn&#x27;t been proven anywhere, nor have they been formally accused, but it came up when Australia dropped them for 5G.<p>1. <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;outline.com&#x2F;WfCzFe" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;outline.com&#x2F;WfCzFe</a> (same as [2], outlined) 2. <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.theaustralian.com.au&#x2F;national-affairs&#x2F;national-security&#x2F;china-used-huawei-to-hack-network-says-secret-report&#x2F;news-story&#x2F;510d3b17c2791cbcac18f047c64ab9d8" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.theaustralian.com.au&#x2F;national-affairs&#x2F;national-s...</a>

I find it irritating how the tech world conversation about this seems to center around &quot;proof&quot;. This is not a court of law, it&#x27;s not innocent until proven guilty. The bar for decision making on this issue is not &quot;beyond an unreasonable doubt&quot;.<p>We&#x27;re talking about letting a company under the control of China, the country responsible for ongoing mass-scale industrial espionage at every level of our economy, build the core communications network for our country. It&#x27;s insanity that it&#x27;s even open for discussion.

&gt; [..] but there was no smoking gun that proved that the company was spying — only that it could at the request of Beijing. [China] doesn’t have a single law that can compel a company to spy on its behalf or put backdoors in its products [..] the government doesn’t need a law<p>&gt; Yet ironically, it’s the U.S. and the U.K. — and more recently Australia — that have laws in place that can in fact compel a company to turn over data, or force a company to install backdoors.<p>Indeed, western national security politics is schizoprenic and hypocritical and can&#x27;t be taken seriously.<p>Instead of worrying specifically so much about Huawei, put funding towards developing secure communications technologies that render backdoors in communications backbones obsolete. This would also protect your own citizens against your own overreaching intelligence services.

From the article:<p>&gt;Only this week, the U.S. said it doesn’t need to show proof, citing the company’s ability to be &quot;leveraged by the Chinese government.&quot;<p>This is actually a valid argument. The leverage is all that is needed for there to be a real threat.<p>However, it is also another reason responsible countries, which could include the US if it wants to be one &lt;cough&gt;, should not allow the creation of laws that would give them analogous leverage over equipment makers in their own countries.<p>In other words, no back doors, and no &quot;it&#x27;s not a back door because we call it something different&quot; back doors either, or else the US does not get to make this argument against Huawei.

Regardless of what Huawei has or hasn&#x27;t done, it&#x27;s written into Chinese law that Chinese organizations are oblidged to assist in espionage operations when needed. This means that companies like Huawei must be considered a national security threat by China&#x27;s rivals. I&#x27;m sure China would view US companies in a similar way.

One could imagine various countries contributing to large open hardware projects and those governments preferring to use specific components that were manufactured &#x27;locally.&#x27; That way you theoretically know what a part does, how it works, and you know it was at least not manufactured somewhere that worries you.<p>I wonder if the cost of local manufacture would just be too high for the economics to work (edit: it would certainly help create jobs anyway)

I&#x27;m not sure &quot;national security&quot; and &quot;without proof, is it a threat&quot; go together. In national security, you make your best estimate, with evidence, but often with less than proof.

All closed-source networking equipment is a national threat. Public infrastructure should use public, freely auditable technology.<p>I know that technically telecom networks are privately owned, but they&#x27;ve become a vital utility to the public at this point, and should be treated as such imo.

There is proof of a nation forcing its companies to give access so that it can spy on nationals not just at home but also abroad. The offending nation is the USA. And for those who believe this was &#x27;legitimate&#x27; and to fight terrorism please note they were also caught spying on Angela Merkel to gain commercial advantage during TTIP discussions. And now the insinuations and slander orchestrated at government level to try to bring down a company that is beating them in the marketplace is further proof that the US government will do anything it can to give US companies an unfair advantage Suggesting we should not deal with the Chinese because we &#x27;cannot trust them&#x27; is downright racist. I do not necessarily look for &#x27;proof beyond reasonable doubt; but today NOTHING has been offered apart from rumours.<p>The best way of avoiding conflict is to have deep rooted commercial interactions such that there is too much to lose from falling out with your neighbours. It has worked in Europe with the EU. Trump seems intent on destroying the existing deeply interwoven supply chains involved in technology today. No US chips in Chinese products and vica versa. Seems like preparations for conflict.

I&#x27;ve heard someone make the opinion that the only main US is so worked up about Huawei is the nsa can&#x27;t get they&#x27;re own backdoor in the equipment