TE
科技回声
首页24小时热榜最新最佳问答展示工作
GitHubTwitter
首页

科技回声

基于 Next.js 构建的科技新闻平台,提供全球科技新闻和讨论内容。

GitHubTwitter

首页

首页最新最佳问答展示工作

资源链接

HackerNews API原版 HackerNewsNext.js

© 2025 科技回声. 版权所有。

In 1959, A 707 variant had design issue similar to 737MAX (1992) [audio]

3 点作者 Treblemaker大约 6 年前

4 条评论

Treblemaker大约 6 年前
I wonder if there was sufficient institutional memory to consider this during the 737MAX certification.<p>In a 1992 recorded interview David P. Davies -- chief pilot of the UK Air Registration Board (ARB) from the 1950&#x27;s through 1970&#x27;s -- described a problem during certification of a new 707 variant that is remarkably similar to the recent 737MAX issue.<p>Fascinating full set of interviews at the main site if you have time to listen to them:<p><a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;soundcloud.com&#x2F;aerosociety-podcast&#x2F;sets" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;soundcloud.com&#x2F;aerosociety-podcast&#x2F;sets</a> (scroll down to &quot;An Interview With...&quot;, and scroll that list for &quot;The D. P. Davies Interview&quot;, #&#x27;s 19, 18, 17, 16)<p>Summary: 707-330C variant added leading-edge devices to the wing that caused center of lift to move forward at high Angle of Attack, increasing the pitching moment and reducing the stick forces. Even though the stall behavior was fairly benign, Davies refused to certify it against broad opposition from the airline customers, Boeing, and even his own management in the ARB.<p>A significant part of his argument was (what I now know as) &quot;Normalization of Deviance&quot;. They &quot;solved&quot; it by adding a stick pusher to &quot;nudge&quot; the yoke forward in certain conditions.
评论 #19528488 未加载
salawat大约 6 年前
This is very illustrative of where Boeing&#x27;s attitude comes from, and furthermore should make very clear that regulatory capture of the FAA is indeed a clear and present threat.<p>I can now say with great satisfaction, that my small collection of individuals whom I steal from in the pursuit of healthy quality&#x2F;certification practices just got a little bit longer. I take my hat off to this gentleman for all his hard work, and his tenacity in the face of pressure from industry.<p>He is an example of how adversarial certification and testing is meant to work. You have to be willing to be the brake that holds up everything until the job is done. If not you, some poor sod down the line who hasn&#x27;t anywhere near the expertise you do gets to pay the price.<p>I also found it interesting that Boeing has a history of &quot;overselling&quot; planes. Forgot which one it was, but that one really stuck out at me.<p>I understand that companies change with the people composing them, but I still see indications that a sense of cavalierism with regards to regulatory compliance, a willingness to pressure regulators to get what they want, and a dangerous tendency to overstate the capabilities and understate the poor behaviors of their aircraft aemre still alive and well today at Boeing as part of their corporate culture. This is not the hallmark of a company you entrust self-certification privileges to.<p>The last thing that stuck out is the unwillingness of Boeing to admit there is a problem with a design, which Davies attributed to Product Liability law. This practice clearly needs to be addressed. I&#x27;m not sure how exactly, but as a society, we cannot afford for our institutions to be incentivized to stuff their fingers in their ears and do everything in their power to keep from acknowledging a problem they created. We as a people, and our Government, simply do not have the bandwidth to counter the evasive behavior incentivized by Product Liability. The law doesn&#x27;t need to be repealed. However, we need to reevaluate whether the law is doing what we need it to since this perverse incentive to act as a 2 year-old and ignore all the facts of the matter until someone else has dug them up independently needs to be addressed.
nutcracker46大约 6 年前
At 1:33:00 Davies gives an essential argument about the dangers of compromise, the nonsense of &quot;equivalent level of safety.&quot; Compromise a little here, a little there, so why not shitcan the whole project?<p>The Boeing 707-336 stick nudger was fitted fleetwide at no extra cost, much as the 737-Max will get annunciations and software to remedy crashes due to AOA&#x2F;MCAS faults.
nutcracker46大约 6 年前
At about 1:08:00 Davies tells a great account of a crew hand flying a Brittania 300 from Heathrow to Vancouver, arriving on fumes. Ha! They started without chocks (or brake pressure) and almost rolled into concrete blocks on the apron.