Internal FAA Review Saw High Risk of 737 Max Crashes

<i>The MAX’s safety record when it was grounded, after two years in service, roughly amounted to two catastrophic accidents for every one million flights, according to estimates by industry officials relying on unofficial data. By contrast, the model of 737 that came before the MAX has suffered one fatal crash for every 10 million flights, according to data from Boeing.</i><p>Put another way, the 737 Max has a statistic of 1 catastrophe per 500k flights, whilst the 737 was 1 per 10 million, <i>basically 20 times</i> as much.<p>This is criminal behaviour, and people need to go to jail. The MAX should never be allowed to fly again.

We finally know fuller details* about the as proposed MCAS fix not-a-fix &gt;<p>There are four main changes to the B737 MAX flight control system software that have been developed to prevent future accidents like the ones that happened with the Lion Air and Ethiopian Air flights. They include the following:<p>1. Angle of Attack (AoA) comparison – an addition to MCAS that will now compare readings from both angle of attack sensors on the aircraft. If there is a difference of more than 5.5 degrees the speed trim system will be disabled. Also included in this change is something known as a “midvalue select” which uses data from both sensors together to create a third input that will help to filter out any AOA signal oscillatory failures or spurious sensor failures. This modification will prevent MCAS from commanding nose down trim when a single AoA sensor reports a false AoA as it happened in the two accident flights.<p>2. MCAS resynchronization – this change will account for manual electric trim inputs made by the pilot while MCAS is activating. It will track whatever input the pilot makes and return the pitch trim to that setting when MCAS retrims back to normal.<p>3. Stab trim command limit – is an addition that will limit the maximum nose down trim that the automatic flight control system can command to prevent the pitch trim from reaching an uncontrollable situation.<p>4. FCC monitors – software monitors have been added to the flight control computers that will cross check pitch trim commands against each other. If a difference is detected by these monitors the automatic trim functions are disabled. This protection helps prevent erroneous trim commands from a myriad of causes that could occur in the automatic flight control system.<p>These design changes in the software that controls the automatic pitch trim features including MCAS should prevent angle of attack sensor failures from causing the pitch trim to operate when it should not. Further, they should prevent the trim from activating erroneously for other reasons as well.<p>* <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;transportation.house.gov&#x2F;download&#x2F;kiefer-testimony" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;transportation.house.gov&#x2F;download&#x2F;kiefer-testimony</a>

Its pretty clear reading the article that the public now has a much higher safety standard than the FAA did internally.<p>Flying has become so safe that the public no longer considers it risky, but the FAA never updated its targets. So when Boeing wanted to trade safety for market share there was no basis to stop them.<p>To illustrate the change in attitude it used to be common for airports to sell life insurance for the flight directly at the gate. This continued as late as the 1980s.<p><a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.insurancebusinessmag.com&#x2F;us&#x2F;news&#x2F;breaking-news&#x2F;a-look-back-whatever-happened-to-airport-insurance-vending-machines-22593.aspx" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.insurancebusinessmag.com&#x2F;us&#x2F;news&#x2F;breaking-news&#x2F;a...</a>

This was a massive shot in the foot by the FAA. Not only they neglected red flags after the first crash, remember that the idiots were also hesitating after the second one, allowing other regulators to ground the Max before them.<p>FAA&#x27;s credibility is in the dumps, along with the Boeing&#x27;s.

<a href="http:&#x2F;&#x2F;archive.is&#x2F;JVWfg" rel="nofollow">http:&#x2F;&#x2F;archive.is&#x2F;JVWfg</a>

&gt; The November 2018 internal Federal Aviation Administration analysis, expected to be released during a House committee hearing Wednesday<p>Is this document publicly available now? Did anyone find it?