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Apple and Google partner on Covid-19 contact tracing technology

823 点作者 ikarandeep大约 5 年前

80 条评论

fauigerzigerk大约 5 年前
Promising opt-in is a bit disingenuous. These tech giants are creating a technological capability. Whether or not it is opt-in, opt-out or mandatory is then decided by governments, now and in the future.<p>This is of course nothing new. But it&#x27;s worth noting considering how high the tolerance for extremely intrusive government action currently is and how extremely weak any resistance is bound to be.<p>I&#x27;m not saying I&#x27;m against contact tracing in the current situation. But that shiny new button that governments get to press will never go away.<p>Edit: Reading the spec, I found a piece of information that may be of interest: This technology allows contact tracing without necessarily revealing the location where that contact has taken place. So that could indeed be a privacy benefit over alternative approaches.<p><a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;covid19-static.cdn-apple.com&#x2F;applications&#x2F;covid19&#x2F;current&#x2F;static&#x2F;contact-tracing&#x2F;pdf&#x2F;ContactTracing-BluetoothSpecification.pdf" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;covid19-static.cdn-apple.com&#x2F;applications&#x2F;covid19&#x2F;cu...</a>
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The_Double大约 5 年前
There is surprisingly little discussion about the actual spec here. It looks really good to me!<p>- Advertisements change every 15 minutes, are not trackable unless keys are shared.<p>- The only central bit is a repository of &quot;infected&quot; daily keys.<p>- No knowledge about contacts is shared with a central authority.<p>Nothing is shared unless you are infected and decide to share your keys, which are only valid for one day. I don&#x27;t see how you could have a real argument against this unless you are a privacy extremist. It also seems more privacy friendly than the Singapore or German apps.
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petedoyle大约 5 年前
This is huge. A limiting factor has been iOS not being able to (on purpose, for privacy, and battery life) do BLE scanning (edit: or advertising, thanks Slartie) in the background. I imagine this will enable that for specific apps, and I have high confidence privacy will be well-implemented by Apple&#x27;s involvement (edit: see tastroder&#x27;s comment for technical docs). Having a single, well-designed spec for Bluetooth advertisement will prevent a world where there are different contact tracing apps, none of which can see each other. Doing this at the platform level will enable enough density of installs to make this effective at scale.
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DavideNL大约 5 年前
Am i the only one who thinks it&#x27;s mindblowing that people use Facebook, Instagram, Linkedin, etc. however now that Apple + Google release a tool to prevent thousands of people from dying in a pandemic they start thinking&#x2F;complaining about the <i>possible</i> privacy implications? (without even having read the specs or knowing the details...)
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soamv大约 5 年前
The spec pdf looks a lot like the DP-3T protocol. The DP-3T docs have more explanation and a good discussion of privacy aspects.<p><a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;github.com&#x2F;DP-3T&#x2F;documents" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;github.com&#x2F;DP-3T&#x2F;documents</a><p>paper: <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;github.com&#x2F;DP-3T&#x2F;documents&#x2F;blob&#x2F;master&#x2F;DP3T%20White%20Paper.pdf" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;github.com&#x2F;DP-3T&#x2F;documents&#x2F;blob&#x2F;master&#x2F;DP3T%20White%...</a><p>data protection aspects: <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;github.com&#x2F;DP-3T&#x2F;documents&#x2F;blob&#x2F;master&#x2F;DP3T%20-%20Data%20Protection%20and%20Security.pdf" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;github.com&#x2F;DP-3T&#x2F;documents&#x2F;blob&#x2F;master&#x2F;DP3T%20-%20Da...</a><p>Here&#x27;s an overview comparing that approach to some others (such as Singapore&#x27;s tracetogether): <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;github.com&#x2F;vteague&#x2F;contactTracing" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;github.com&#x2F;vteague&#x2F;contactTracing</a>
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pimterry大约 5 年前
An interesting Twitter thread on why the stand-alone contact tracing apps that many others are building won&#x27;t work, and why integrated platform solutions like this are necessary: <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;twitter.com&#x2F;zainy&#x2F;status&#x2F;1248482486524379137" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;twitter.com&#x2F;zainy&#x2F;status&#x2F;1248482486524379137</a> (but of course, necessary does not mean sufficient)
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crypt1d大约 5 年前
I&#x27;ve spent the last 3 weeks with my team building exactly this - contact tracing apps for both android and ios that use bluetooth tech[1]. This will probably require us to redo the app completely to fit into their API plans, but I&#x27;m glad they are, in a way, acknowledging our idea.<p>The troubling thing is, bluetooth-based contact tracing is in no way easy. Different android phones handle background bluetooth scanning &#x2F; advertising differently and some tend to require additional config changes - such as disabling battery saving features - to even make it work. And iOS bluetooth advertising in background is just bad. Since u can&#x27;t add custom UUIDs to the advertisement package, just advertising data is often not enough, so u have to connect too, which creates a range of other problems. I suspect they will release OS upgrades to solve some of these issues, but not all devices will be fixable (eg, older Android devices). This, combined with the fact that they will start rolling out this feature in May, makes me think it will not help us much for the latest wave of COVID-19 infections. Might come in handy for the next epidemic, though.<p>[1] - <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;github.com&#x2F;cryptekio&#x2F;corridorapp-android" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;github.com&#x2F;cryptekio&#x2F;corridorapp-android</a>
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justusthane大约 5 年前
Pretty good illustration of how private and secure contact tracing can work here: <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;ncase.me&#x2F;contact-tracing&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;ncase.me&#x2F;contact-tracing&#x2F;</a><p>Not sure whether that&#x27;s what this implementation would look like.
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acqq大约 5 年前
The relevant privacy details:<p><a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;covid19-static.cdn-apple.com&#x2F;applications&#x2F;covid19&#x2F;current&#x2F;static&#x2F;contact-tracing&#x2F;pdf&#x2F;ContactTracing-CryptographySpecification.pdf" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;covid19-static.cdn-apple.com&#x2F;applications&#x2F;covid19&#x2F;cu...</a><p>&quot;Privacy Considerations<p>• The key schedule is fixed and defined by operating system components, preventing applications from including static or predictable information that could be used for tracking.<p>• A user’s Rolling Proximity Identifiers cannot be correlated without having the Daily Tracing Key. This reduces the risk of privacy loss from advertising them.<p>• A server operator implementing this protocol does not learn who users have been in proximity with or users’ location unless it also has the unlikely capability to scan advertisements from users who recently reported Diagnosis Keys.<p>• Without the release of the Daily Tracing Keys, it is not computationally feasible for an attacker to find a collision on a Rolling Proximity Identifier. This prevents a wide-range of replay and impersonation attacks.<p>• When reporting Diagnosis Keys, the correlation of Rolling Proximity Identifiers by others is limited to 24h periods due to the use of Daily Tracing Keys. The server must not retain metadata from clients uploading Diagnosis Keys after including them into the aggregated list of Diagnosis Keys per day.&quot;<p>It doesn&#x27;t look bad, at least, at the first sight.<p>A detail: I hope the &quot;day begin&quot; for the &quot;Daily Tracing Key&quot; is the same for all users? I.e. not a local day but e.g. GMT+0 day or something.
Reason077大约 5 年前
That combination Apple-Google logogram is scary! It’s like an image from some corporate future dystopian sci-fi.
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olgs大约 5 年前
Looks like it was inspired by the TraceTogether app built by the Singapore Government and recently Opensourced.<p><a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.gov.sg&#x2F;article&#x2F;help-speed-up-contact-tracing-with-tracetogether" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.gov.sg&#x2F;article&#x2F;help-speed-up-contact-tracing-wit...</a><p><a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;github.com&#x2F;OpenTrace-community" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;github.com&#x2F;OpenTrace-community</a>
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kccqzy大约 5 年前
Google announcement: <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.blog.google&#x2F;inside-google&#x2F;company-announcements&#x2F;apple-and-google-partner-covid-19-contact-tracing-technology&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.blog.google&#x2F;inside-google&#x2F;company-announcements&#x2F;...</a>
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blhack大约 5 年前
The interest in &quot;privacy&quot; around contact tracing seems like a ship that sailed a long time ago to me. Verizon etc all already have this data, and it isn&#x27;t &quot;private&quot;, and so does uber, lyft, and every other overly-aggressive-permission-askning-app that anybody has ever installed.<p>Privacy is really important: but we lost it all a long long time ago. Maybe saying &quot;well now we can do a good job of contact tracing&quot; is at least <i>some</i> good coming out of that loss of privacy. I just hope we don&#x27;t end up wasting time trying to make the contact tracing &quot;private&quot; as if by doing otherwise we&#x27;d be giving something up that we didn&#x27;t already give up long ago.
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A4ET8a8uTh0大约 5 年前
Two major OS platforms covering majority of the population working together in an attempt to better track current populations at behest of the government. How could anyone even begin to feel a wee bit cynical? To question this effort it worse than wanting PATRIOT ACT to expire. It is downright unamerican.<p>I hate the fact that I definitely see a good reason for it and the goverment is more than happy to accommodate this power grab.
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lalos大约 5 年前
It just takes one erroneous logging call in the wrong place and all this niceness goes away. Hopefully we don&#x27;t get a headline in the future of &quot;Bug found with contact tracing app, we actually had access to everything but we&#x27;re sorry and we&#x27;ll fix it&quot;. Not entirely against this work, it will provide benefit but let&#x27;s hope for the best.
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nixpulvis大约 5 年前
The key in all this is the users ability to <i>choose</i> to disclose when they were tested as infected. If this choice isn&#x27;t baked deep into the protocol, it will be far to easy for things to go horribly wrong down the road as this technology is adapted for other roles.<p>As an obvious (and not all that impossible) example, consider a Bluetooth device owning person who is, in fact, physically isolated. No amount of &quot;privacy preserving&quot; anything will fix the issue if they know they&#x27;ve only been within range of 2 other people in the last &lt;insert time window here&gt;.<p>The paranoid user would want to change their disclosure settings upon entering the domain of this isolated individual, since they can be sure they would be able to identified.<p>Sadly, not all users will know who was and who was not isolated, so the notion of privacy is simply impossible as far as I can tell. You are weighing the social good vs the potential personal harm based on your unique environment. Nothing fundamentally changes this.
est31大约 5 年前
<a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;covid19-static.cdn-apple.com&#x2F;applications&#x2F;covid19&#x2F;current&#x2F;static&#x2F;contact-tracing&#x2F;pdf&#x2F;ContactTracing-CryptographySpecification.pdf" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;covid19-static.cdn-apple.com&#x2F;applications&#x2F;covid19&#x2F;cu...</a><p>&gt; Upon a positive test of a user for COVID-19, their Diagnosis Keys and associated DayNumbers are uploaded to the Diagnosis Server. A Diagnosis Server is a server that aggregates the Diagnosis Keys from the users who tested positive and distributes them to all the user clients who are using contact tracing.<p>Is this scalable? Earlier in the document they mentioned that the tracing keys are 16 bytes long. Let&#x27;s assume that there are 3 million patients in a country. That&#x27;d be 48 megabytes each user has to download and process <i>per day</i> to check whether they&#x27;ve been in contact with an infected person (processing involves calculation of 144 HMACs per tracing key). I don&#x27;t think this is feasible at scale and one can&#x27;t avoid thinking about area recognizing diagnosis servers.<p>E.g. Smartphones of patients would upload not just the diagnosis keys, but also the areas (county, district, something like that) they&#x27;ve been inside during that day. Then smartphones querying the diagnosis servers would have to send the areas they are interested in. But it&#x27;s easy to see that this approach is then quite privacy invading. On the bright side, this info is already available to carriers so it&#x27;s already a sunken cost so to speak.
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divbzero大约 5 年前
This is the best news I’ve heard all week.<p>I had thought that Apple and Google are in the best position to distribute contact tracing widely [1] but couldn’t figure out if they were working on it. It turns out they were.<p>[1]: <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=22704460" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=22704460</a><p>Big tech can do good and we should applaud their efforts when they do it right.
tlrobinson大约 5 年前
Moxie&#x27;s analysis: <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;twitter.com&#x2F;moxie&#x2F;status&#x2F;1248707315626201088" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;twitter.com&#x2F;moxie&#x2F;status&#x2F;1248707315626201088</a>
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fareesh大约 5 年前
Can we put the genie back in the bottle after this is over? I feel like once there&#x27;s a precedent to do this, it becomes a slippery slope to less palatable things, even if not the worst possible things.
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graeme大约 5 年前
Thinking big, if this works against covid: could it later be used to severely limit or eliminate diseases such as the common cold and the flu?<p>That would be an incredible win for humanity.
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jefftk大约 5 年前
See <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;idlewords.com&#x2F;2020&#x2F;03&#x2F;we_need_a_massive_surveillance_program.htm" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;idlewords.com&#x2F;2020&#x2F;03&#x2F;we_need_a_massive_surveillance...</a> for why this is really important
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almost_usual大约 5 年前
I think this would be a good solution for essential workers to track their personal health while social distancing is in effect.<p>I can foresee a large second wave due to this falling short if we relax social distancing measures. There have been cases where people test positive then test negative and then positive again. It would require redundant testing per individual on a schedule.<p>There are a lot of people who will not be tested, there are a lot of people without smartphones. This virus has spread so far at this point we’d need to test every US citizen to know the blast radius.<p>I understand people are hopeful and want things to return to ‘normal’ but I can’t imagine it without a vaccine in the US.
kian大约 5 年前
It says this is opt-in - is this just the sending of covid information, or is it the entire contact-tracing key-exchange enterprise?
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freakynit大约 5 年前
This has a very serious potential to be misused to target an individual for nefarious purposes.
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zby大约 5 年前
I know it is about APIs - but no mention of any Free or at least Open Source Software example implementations makes me worry.<p>I was expecting that people would organize around git repos - but no, just one of the many COVID tracing initiatives published their code.<p>It is <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;github.com&#x2F;tripleblindmarket&#x2F;covid-safe-paths" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;github.com&#x2F;tripleblindmarket&#x2F;covid-safe-paths</a> by the way.
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rburhum大约 5 年前
Went over the docs (Google and Apple&#x27;s), but there are a few things that are not clear to me.<p>This is my summary of how I interpreted it works:<p>- A [Tracing Key] is stored locally in every device.<p>- A [Rolling Key] gets regenerated every day based on the [Tracing Key]<p>- A [Proximity Identifier] gets regenerated every 15 minutes and broadcasted to other bluetooth devices.<p>- The Contact Tracing Bluetooth Specification does not require the user’s location; any use of location is completely optional to the schema.<p>- Other devices save the [Proximity Identifier] locally.<p>- History is stored for a couple of weeks<p>Some questions about how I interpreted the rest:<p>- The device wakes up once a day and downloads the list of identifiers that have been known&#x2F;reported to have COVID. It compares on device that you are on that list. Q: Wouldn&#x27;t this list be insanely long? More so if it doesn&#x27;t have any concept of location?<p>- If you have COVID-19, you can report to the servers that you were found to have it. Your rolling identifiers gets uploaded to the &quot;cloud server&quot;. Q: Which &quot;cloud server&quot;? Whose cloud server?<p>Any clarifications are strongly welcomed :)<p>- If diagnosed with COVID-19, users consent to sharing Diagnosis Keys with the server.
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sneak大约 5 年前
PDF of spec draft: <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;covid19-static.cdn-apple.com&#x2F;applications&#x2F;covid19&#x2F;current&#x2F;static&#x2F;contact-tracing&#x2F;pdf&#x2F;ContactTracing-CryptographySpecification.pdf" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;covid19-static.cdn-apple.com&#x2F;applications&#x2F;covid19&#x2F;cu...</a>
rojobuffalo大约 5 年前
Contact tracing has a time and place, and it&#x27;s early in isolated outbreaks. The cat is out of the bag at this point and thinking we&#x27;re going to contact trace our way to safety is a false promise. You&#x27;d have to be naive and short-sighted to accept their pinky-promise of privacy-first in this context.
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devonproctor大约 5 年前
I&#x27;m surprised that there isn&#x27;t more discussion of leveraging the extensive location data that Google already routinely collects via Android and Google Maps mobile apps.<p>I&#x27;d love any feedback on this simple proposal for a way to enable individuals to contribute their Google location history data to health care organizations: <a href="http:&#x2F;&#x2F;covidcontacttracing.com" rel="nofollow">http:&#x2F;&#x2F;covidcontacttracing.com</a>.<p>This uses public Google APIs and Google Takeout to get raw gps data and inferred semantic locations from Google to COVID-19 response organizations. I&#x27;ve got a prototype that&#x27;s essentially ready to deploy if anyone has suggestions for potential partners.<p>I think the Google&#x2F;Apple proposal is very promising, but I don&#x27;t see any reason not to also put existing data to work on this problem.
jefftk大约 5 年前
<i>&gt; would allow more individuals to participate, if they choose to opt in</i><p>I don&#x27;t see how this can work unless it gets very high distribution. I wonder if local governments might do something where the shelter-in-place orders are lifted for some categories of people conditional on running the app?
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bogomipz大约 5 年前
Interesting although it seem as though Singapore&#x27;s &quot;TraceTogether&quot; app was able to work successfully without any of these APIs no?<p>Tangentially related - Singapore plans to open source their app. There&#x27;s a few details about how it works here:<p><a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.theregister.co.uk&#x2F;2020&#x2F;03&#x2F;26&#x2F;singapore_tracetogether_coronavirus_encounter_tracing_app_lessons&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.theregister.co.uk&#x2F;2020&#x2F;03&#x2F;26&#x2F;singapore_tracetoge...</a><p>Also interesting to read some of the reviews of the app here:<p><a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;play.google.com&#x2F;store&#x2F;apps&#x2F;details?id=sg.gov.tech.bluetrace" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;play.google.com&#x2F;store&#x2F;apps&#x2F;details?id=sg.gov.tech.bl...</a>
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samizdis大约 5 年前
OK, that&#x27;s me putting the smartphone in a drawer and picking up a Nokia 3310.
champtar大约 5 年前
The spec seems nice, but we need a unique app with a unique set of &quot;diagnosis servers&quot;. When you take an international flight with one or multiple connections you are in contact with people from many different countries, should you install all the available contact tracing app available on the app store ?<p>If you have one app per country, you could have the &quot;diagnosis servers&quot; of all the countries federate and exchange data, but in the end it&#x27;s easier and more effective to have 1 official open-source app from say the WHO.
ericlavigne大约 5 年前
This is excellent news. Many open source projects have been working on this contact tracing approach for a while now and have been asking Apple and Google to provide this kind of support.<p>TCN Coalition is an umbrella group for open source projects who have agreed on a common protocol, which Apple and Google are also following fairly closely. I am one of the developers for CoEpi, a member of the TCN Coalition.<p><a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;tcn-coalition.org&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;tcn-coalition.org&#x2F;</a>
pzumk大约 5 年前
&gt; We will openly publish information about our work for others to analyze.<p>Great!
santhoshr大约 5 年前
The Indian Government launched a contact tracing app that has more than 10m+ downloads: <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.mygov.in&#x2F;aarogya-setu-app&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.mygov.in&#x2F;aarogya-setu-app&#x2F;</a><p>Not sure how ubiquitous it is. Nevertheless, given that Android is 90 percent of the market in India, may be this can help overcome the iPhone OS-level constraints that makes it necessary for both platforms to work together in markets like the US.
kncvetko大约 5 年前
As far as I understand the actual risk assessment is done by the Contact Tracing Framework.<p>I wonder why this design decision was made. The risk assessment will change and the apps done by health organization have the expertise on that subject and shall do the assessment and not the CT framework. It will require an update of the OS to get latest findings published.<p>Privacy and other technical decisions are sound and legit.<p>Has somebody some background information on the reasoning driving that design decision?
paul7986大约 5 年前
Oh those 5G conspiracy theories are now an inch less crazy..still crazy but contact tracing is indeed big brother. Though for now it&#x27;s only opt in until there&#x27;s an outbreak in a city or state then the government will recommend then mandate it in those areas. Then as time goes on it becomes the norm and the majority are fine with being monitored and watched by the government. Public health vs. human rights&#x2F;privacy.
nojvek大约 5 年前
This is really hard to keep private and anonymous, but I&#x27;m glad that the world&#x27;s to biggest mobile OS makers are working on this.<p>If this does really work, it could trace millions of people and give this pandemic some sort of order. Identify hotspots and show a heat map of spread.<p>Definitely a step in the right direction, hopefully it&#x27;s executed well too. I&#x27;m pretty sure Microsoft be jealous they didn&#x27;t win the Mobile OS market.
simonsaidit大约 5 年前
Does this then allow us to run this in the background on iphone. The Danish and Norwegian governments are looking at using a GPS+Bluetooth based version because iPhone is so common and not able to work with Bluetooth when the app is not active is their argument. Also based on a centralized server. My hope was apple would in this circumstance allow Bluetooth to work differently so avoid unnecessary location data.
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im3w1l大约 5 年前
You can troll by falsely claiming to be infected. With strategically placed beacons you could scare a lot of people. If the system is as private as they claim it will be hard to filter out serial trolls.<p>I suspect they will try to join whatever data is present in your &quot;I&#x27;m infected&quot; report (at least IP, idk if there will be other stuff. advertiser id?) with their other databases, using trolls as a justification.
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tmpz22大约 5 年前
This project may be necessary to enable fair elections in the United States and other democratic countries through November. On the other hand if built improperly it could usher in a 1984-style future with gerrymandering, vote-rigging, and huge increases in surveillance based government suppression. When the government is granted emergency powers it almost never gives them back.<p>Please do not fuck this up.
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jborichevskiy大约 5 年前
I am much happier Apple is in the mix here, versus say Google x Amazon. Will that be enough to reign in the privacy concerns though, who knows
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Analemma_大约 5 年前
For context, start with <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.vox.com&#x2F;2020&#x2F;4&#x2F;10&#x2F;21215494&#x2F;coronavirus-plans-social-distancing-economy-recession-depression-unemployment" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.vox.com&#x2F;2020&#x2F;4&#x2F;10&#x2F;21215494&#x2F;coronavirus-plans-soc...</a><p>The tl;dr is that without a <i>huge</i>, nigh-omniscient program to trace individual cases, we have no choice but to go on and off Covid lockdown for a year or more, with potentially devastating economic consequences.<p>Having Apple and Google develop a built-in tracing program to their phones with firm privacy guarantees is not good, but it might be the least-bad solution we have right now.
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zajio1am大约 5 年前
Cannot devices be tracked just by their Bluetooth MAC addresses, or is this technology uses some special frames that do not use these?
FartyMcFarter大约 5 年前
This is wonderful news for any surveillance state. As the three-page brief on DP-3T [1] says:<p>&quot;A tech-savvy adversary could reidentify identifiers of infected people that they have been physically close to in the past by<p>i) actively modifying the app to record more specific identifier data and<p>ii) collecting extra information about identities through additional means, such as a surveillance camera to record and identify the individuals. This would generally be illegal, would be spatially limited, and high effort.&quot;<p>If I read this correctly, this means that a government could collect identifier data on a per-location basis and later link this to someone&#x27;s identity (for example with cameras or by tracking the IP address of uploaded identifiers).<p>Unfortunately I can think of quite a few entities (e.g. governments) who are not too worried about doing high effort, spatially limited things in order to track people&#x27;s locations. Saying that this is &quot;illegal&quot; (which is probably not even true in all countries) does not give me confidence it wouldn&#x27;t happen either.<p>[1] <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;github.com&#x2F;DP-3T&#x2F;documents&#x2F;raw&#x2F;master&#x2F;DP3T%20-%20Simplified%20Three%20Page%20Brief.pdf" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;github.com&#x2F;DP-3T&#x2F;documents&#x2F;raw&#x2F;master&#x2F;DP3T%20-%20Sim...</a>
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zajio1am大约 5 年前
I guess court order could be used to get daily tracking keys from you regardless of covid-19 status, so it could be used for tracking for other cases.<p>While it does not directly encode position, with sufficient large network of bluetooth trackers on key places (like mass transit stations) one can be tracked sufficiently well by that.
gideon_b大约 5 年前
This is a good thing, and I think in the absence of this solution we would see intrusive solutions backed by governments and mandated by law. I do have two questions:<p>Is there a plan to verify test results? Are public health authorities in small countries&#x2F;regions expected to build and maintain an app and a server from scratch?
amitnme大约 5 年前
Check out the Indian version of the technology out there since a couple of week.<p><a href="http:&#x2F;&#x2F;jan-sampark.nic.in&#x2F;campaigns&#x2F;2020&#x2F;04-Apr&#x2F;Arogya&#x2F;index.html" rel="nofollow">http:&#x2F;&#x2F;jan-sampark.nic.in&#x2F;campaigns&#x2F;2020&#x2F;04-Apr&#x2F;Arogya&#x2F;index...</a>
TomMckenny大约 5 年前
As an aside, I&#x27;m not clear why tech startups and VC panicked over this catastrophe. Given their extreme flexibility, I would think this is the most promising sector to do some good stuff at the moment and do well after in any disrupted future environment.
ThePhysicist大约 5 年前
Good. I always thought if we really want to implement this the two mobile giants need to propose a standard and implement it on the OS level. It of course needs to be opt-in and the privacy and security needs to be provable and auditable.
Jeija大约 5 年前
I&#x27;ve been pondering over the idea of offering the option to use physical device, like e.g. a Bluetooth bracelet, for contact tracing in addition to apps.<p>For contact tracing to have an impact at all, we need a quite large percentage of the population to use one of these apps. Even if 60% of the population had some kind of app installed and this app worked properly, we would still only detect just 36% of all new infections, since both parties (infected person and person to be infected) need to use the app. There is a significant portion of the population that does not want to or cannot use such an app, e.g. the elderly, kids too young to have their own smartphone, people with certain disabilities, people that can&#x27;t carry their phone with them all the time (e.g. while doing sports &#x2F; working) etc. This population can still be relevant in spreading the virus - for instance, when loosening lockdowns, young children attending kindergarten &#x2F; school can bridge the gap between families.<p>Moreover, even among those that own a smartphone and that want to use the app, I just can&#x27;t see it all work flawlessly. Outside of the tech bubble, I see many people with older Android &#x2F; iOS versions that don&#x27;t receive updates (which might be crucial for contact tracing to function without having to keep the app open at all times) or people simply failing to install updates. We also don&#x27;t want the app to be too sensitive (an infected person that happens to be at the opposite end of the same subway car shouldn&#x27;t trigger quarantine for you), but also not too insensitive (people might put their phone in handbags or attenuate BLE radio waves with their body).<p>I think that these problems could be solved by offering something like a standalone Bluetooth bracelet, compatible with whatever App becomes the standard. It should be possible to mass-produce these relatively cheaply (&lt;5$, which a BLE beacon currently costs). They would use a Bluetooth chip with know characteristics and are worn at a defined location (wrist), so it&#x27;s going to be much easier to correctly tune their sensitivity. The time-to-market will of course be longer than that of a potential app, but it currently seems like we&#x27;re going to have to live with the virus for a couple of months to come.<p>The only technical problem I see is that the physical bracelet would need to receive a (trusted) &quot;list of infected IDs&quot; somehow. Maybe a mesh network of bracelets with smartphones as information providers could work? Maybe bracelets could connect to public WiFi? Or maybe we could leverage some existing low-tech data broadcast infrastructure such as RBDS&#x2F;RDS (Radio Data System)?
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mrkramer大约 5 年前
I&#x27;m worried about security implications of this technology.<p>First of all how reliable this technology will be since its results will or can be used in courts.<p>Secondly how contact tracing logs will be secured since they can be stolen or sniffed in a real time.<p>I didn&#x27;t read technology documentation drafts and I used Bluetooth last time on old generation of phones way before smart phones and I&#x27;m interested for how long this tracing sessions will last since you can map devices that have turned on bluetooth in any given area(Tran stations,libraries etc.) You can do something similar to Wardriving (en.wikipedia.org&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;Wardriving).
intrd大约 5 年前
Lots of privacy issues... on the other hand, they&#x27;ve always done it under the hood for decades, now doing for a greater good with opt-in&#x2F;out looks ok.
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xenospn大约 5 年前
And now it will be up to the carriers to push out the Android update to the end users. And we all know how well that&#x27;s going to go.
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haoc大约 5 年前
Does this all depend on people&#x27;s opt-in and self-report? What is the minimum opt-in percentage to keep the system functional?
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szczepano大约 5 年前
Ok so looks like the key to understand is flow diagram from ContactTracing-BluetoothSpecification.pdf page 6 scanning: CFUserNotification &quot;App would like to access time and duration of your %d contacts. Approve?&quot;<p>What it looks like it&#x27;s application framework based on system service I hope they won&#x27;t start advertising ios bluetooth all the time and only allow application to do it. In that case application can be safely removed.<p>I am also concerned about cloud Diagnosis_Keys
briefcomment大约 5 年前
That logo at the bottom gives me chills.
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KCUOJJQJ大约 5 年前
I don&#x27;t want this functionality&#x2F;software on my phone. Will it be possible not to get it?
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alexbanks大约 5 年前
Is contact tracing technology categorically different from mass surveillance technology?
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davelondon大约 5 年前
I tweeted about exactly this last month. Great news!<p><a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;twitter.com&#x2F;dbrophy&#x2F;status&#x2F;1241434641250299905" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;twitter.com&#x2F;dbrophy&#x2F;status&#x2F;1241434641250299905</a>
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pkaye大约 5 年前
Is this the approach that South Korea and Singapore used?
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foobarbazetc大约 5 年前
<a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;twitter.com&#x2F;moxie&#x2F;status&#x2F;1248707315626201088?s=21" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;twitter.com&#x2F;moxie&#x2F;status&#x2F;1248707315626201088?s=21</a>
clairity大约 5 年前
we need to collectively take a step back and put this pandemic into proper perspective so we don&#x27;t fall for privacy and liberty erosions like this. the panic is unproductive and dangerous to our civil rights.<p>for context, roughly 8000 people die per day in the US. the virus has killed 2 days worth of people in the US in the 80 days of <i>known</i> infection, and probably ~100 days of undiagnosed infection. so covid has killed 2% of the expected number of dead. it&#x27;s serious, but it&#x27;s not the black plague, or even the 1918 flu. and we&#x27;re already seeing transmissions curb.<p>the virus overwhelmingly infects others in close and closed proximity with a lot of cross-breathing going on. random airborne infections or surface infections are likely small, certainly less than 10%, probably less than 1% of infections.<p>so, you don&#x27;t need to social distance outside unless the other person is actively coughing&#x2F;sneezing (or maybe singing&#x2F;talking extra forcefully) in your direction within 6 feet. you don&#x27;t need a mask unless you are in close proximity (less than 6 feet) to random other people for more than a couple minutes at a time. grocery clerks, and other service workers in close proximity to strangers, on the other hand, <i>should</i> wear non-n95 masks (but probably not gloves) during work. same with those who are often near folks with comorbidities like age, auto-immune disease, diabetes, etc. medical providers should wear n95 masks, gloves, gowns, and take many other precautions that make no sense for the general public. you are not lowering your risks in any percepitble way by doing so. allay your anxieties with those basics, rather than looking to buy more toilet paper. it&#x27;s enough, really.<p>the overwhelmingly most effective way to prevent transmission is to not breath in a sick person&#x27;s exhaust. that&#x27;s it. that&#x27;s all we need to do. and yes, we don&#x27;t know everyone who&#x27;s carrying the virus, so it makes sense to reasonably physically distance in enclosed places like grocery stores. but not more than that as you&#x27;ve already reduced risk to background noise with these basic distancing rules.<p>contact tracing only makes sense when groups of strangers come into close proximity. it doesn&#x27;t need to track every single person you brush past on the street. so for instance, you could just provide &quot;contact tracing&quot; with beacons in stores rather than always-on phone tracing.<p>let&#x27;s not lose our heads, and our rights, over this.
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tanilama大约 5 年前
About time, we need it now!
hprotagonist大约 5 年前
it is just shockingly important that we come out of this _without_ a dystopian nightmare of a surveillance state.<p>That apple&#x27;s involved in this is hopeful -- their earlier work on anonymizing Maps.app directions is well worth thinking about here. tl;dr your route is broken up into n chunks, each chunk gets a uuid that isn&#x27;t tied to your handset, and so serverside nobody knows where Bob&#x27;s Iphone just asked to go. [0]<p>Doing this kind of &quot;differential privacy&quot; or whatever we want to call it today <i>properly</i> is very hard, but it is also very, very important to get right.<p>[0] <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.idownloadblog.com&#x2F;2019&#x2F;03&#x2F;13&#x2F;apple-maps-navigation-privacy&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.idownloadblog.com&#x2F;2019&#x2F;03&#x2F;13&#x2F;apple-maps-navigati...</a>
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mrfusion大约 5 年前
I wish we’d just stick with flatten the curve and get in with our lives :-(
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droithomme大约 5 年前
So those of us without cell phones or with cell phones that we don&#x27;t activate, we can definitely opt out of the tracking and this will be respected forever without exception through a constitutional privacy amendment, right?<p>Also we&#x27;re all going to continue to be &quot;allowed&quot; to turn off bluetooth to save on battery right? (Spoiler: no, the system only works if it&#x27;s bluetooth on all the time for everyone no exceptions even though bluetooth is absolute low quality poorly engineered garbage as a technology.)<p>And those of us who are brainless and perfectly compliant sheeple obeying everything the government and media tells us without questioning or rational thought will be allowed to keep our old cell phones with the previous obsolete bluetooth standards correct and not be forced to buy a very expensive brand new phone we don&#x27;t really need and can&#x27;t afford, even though that severely damages the ability of the powers that be to mitigate the latest crisis they have intentionally created, right? (Ha ha ha.)
Geee大约 5 年前
It&#x27;s quite horrible if it becomes a standard API. What a gold mine it is for ad business to be able to tell which groups of people are together. It can be used to track &#x27;idea spreading&#x27; as well.
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ddmma大约 5 年前
Wait what.. apple and google devices can ping over bluetooth? Clearly an apocalipse sign
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riffic大约 5 年前
I just can&#x27;t <i>wait</i> to see this being turned against us.
maxdo大约 5 年前
All those actions look unprofessional and chaotic, why not use cellphone data, surveillance needs to use their power, to track down cases and contacts. They doing that anyway, why not leverage that. Call it emergency whatever.
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superkuh大约 5 年前
I have never carried a cell phone (smart of otherwise) in my life. I leave my dumb phone at home or take the battery out. I hope that these tracking bracelets which others voluntarily carry will not be forced and required in the future.
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guscost大约 5 年前
It’s odd that the folks picking this apart looking for surveillance risks don’t seem to be one-tenth as bothered by Facebook censoring wackos (and indeed anyone determined to be guilty of wrong-thinking), or you know, <i>the government literally arresting people for leaving their houses</i>.
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ck2大约 5 年前
We learned so little after 9&#x2F;11, we still live with TSA security-theater nightmare to this day (ironically now spreading covid19 with their groping and concentrating crowds into small spaces)<p>So now this nightmare is going to give historical tracking data to government entities without warrants forever.<p>And Barr is going to get encryption backdoors with his theater.<p>How about just making a test that costs a few cents in million quantities that you can take at home. It won&#x27;t be the last time we need that tech for a virus.
billions大约 5 年前
I built <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;sneezemap.com&#x2F;?zone=eyJjZW50ZXIiOlszNi4zODU5MTI3NzI4.." rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;sneezemap.com&#x2F;?zone=eyJjZW50ZXIiOlszNi4zODU5MTI3NzI4...</a>. - a crowdsourced Covid-19 symptoms tracker &amp; forecasting system with over 15000 participants. 100% anonymous from day 1.
tengbretson大约 5 年前
For the last 4 years I&#x27;ve read a constant stream of articles about how &quot;This will be the end of our democracy&quot;, &quot;Democracy is under threat!&quot;, etc.<p>If we as a society agree to ubiquitous, mandatory location tracking and a complete suspension of the right to assembly in response to this virus then we never deserved a democracy in the first place.
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aazaa大约 5 年前
Why is this API even necessary? Isn&#x27;t every individual with a smart phone already tracked de facto?<p>Why add a technological fig-leaf to what is by now a deplorable privacy situation? Just roll with it, change whatever laws need to be changed, and be done with it. The data collection capabilities already exist to do contact tracing, it seems.
buboard大约 5 年前
Why is this needed? and why would i sign up for it , esp. knowing how much they both know about me already? The text doesn&#x27;t tell us why contact tracing is important<p>- Did contact tracing apps really save anything in singapore&#x2F;taiwan&#x2F;israel?<p>- Is sweden really doing that bad without this kind of surveillance?<p>- What is tracing going to help anyway? it will warn people to go to the hospital early ? To do what? there is no cure and they &#x27;d better stay away from infection nests like hospitals anyway. It&#x27;s not like people don&#x27;t get symptoms days before they need hospitalization<p>- Is tracing really going to be workable? this is a highly infectious virus, and people networks have very short path length, which means that, without social distancing, 100% of the people will get notified that they might have been infected in any day<p>- This data does not need to reach anyone&#x27;s servers. Infected people could just publicly and anonymously upload their location in a public server for other users to crosscheck. The less data are hidden behind walls, the less chance of abuse.<p>Even if tracing might slow down the curve, this slowdown shouldnt last forever and it should be targetted, not anonymous. It is important that the spread speeds up in the parts of the population that carry less risk (children, women). There is really no good way to do that other than specific , local measures of SD.<p>It would be very different if these phones had a thermometer, but i think some regulator removed them.