I find three things about the encryption debate really weird.<p>#1 Split brain<p>The "same" government that gave us Tor (onion routing) wants to take it away. So at least some of the players understand the practical need for encryption. I'd rather those pro and con insiders fight it out, instead of fighting by proxy thru us citizens and consumers.<p>#2 Fishing expeditions<p>What possible value does unlocking, decryption have <i>after the fact</i>?<p>Does the FBI really need to unlock a spree shooter's iPhone? Why? What could they possibly learn? They already have all the meta data like FOAF, location, purchases. What more are they looking for? To better establish guilt?<p>And any one already under surveillance has already had their entire life rootkitted. So again no need for after the fact unlocking.<p>#3 Trusting trust, time boxed secrecy<p>I've had many, many fruitless conversations about computer security (wrt election integrity) with non-tech policy makers. I have yet to figure out how to convey the understanding that backdoors and security thru obscurity is no security at all.<p>The best policy compromise proposal that I can imagine, and I'm spitballing here, is formalizing some kind of temporal privacy.<p>Using voting and secret ballots as an example:<p>I absolutely do not want any one any where to know anyone's votes during an election. I don't even want precounts, so that pols and admins can preview tabulations. But I also don't care at all if someone knows how I voted <i>after</i> the election is certified. (Sure, there's still some risk of coercion and vote buying. But there are easier attack vectors for which we have no mitigation, so it's comparatively minor.)<p>So instead of trying to protect all secrets for all time, I think all the players might be able to chill a bit if we time boxed most secrets.<p>(I have other proposals for protecting personal privacy, like with medical records.)