I think this is an excellent decision -- the "toggle" design seemed seriously unsafe. Consider the list of TorButton bugs that have already been fixed: <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?group=priority&component=Torbutton&order=priority&col=id&col=summary&col=component&col=type&col=status&col=priority&col=milestone&col=points&report=14&type=defect" rel="nofollow">https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?group=priorit...</a> How much would you bet that there isn't at least one more anonymity-compromising bug in there?<p>The new design seems much less Rube-Goldbergy. That said, I still think this style of interface offers only quite casual protection, since it relies on (the forked version of) Firefox not having any bugs that leak information. So any adversary who has enough resources to obtain a zero-day Firefox exploit that allows arbitrary code execution is able to completely deanonymize you. This is probably good enough for e.g. the masses in Iran, but not for would-be Wikileakers.<p>What I really would like to see is a virtual machine setup that lets you run your webbrowers in a VM, and provides the guest OS with a simulated network interface which actually connects through Tor. That would make for a much smaller attack surface. But last time I looked, I couldn't find one.