Noted elsewhere:<p><i>The Belarus plane hijack is a small reminder why it's generally not a good idea to let governments know who is going to where. I'm not sure why governments that like to think of themselves as democratic don't see the risks.</i><p>-- Alexander Bochmann <a href="https://mastodon.infra.de/@galaxis/106285985254850170" rel="nofollow">https://mastodon.infra.de/@galaxis/106285985254850170</a><p>I'd made a similar point following the assassination of Kim Jung-nam in 2017:<p><i>Travel and hospitality databases are widely accessible and shared amongst a tremendous number of organisations. State intelligence organisations might readily have access through their own state-run airline, or through private operations or plants within same. Similarly for terrorist, narco-criminal, money-laundering, or other organisations. Financial, banking, and payment-processing systems, only slightly less so. A P.I. license or position on a fraud or abuse desk at a major online retailer, or any skip-tracing agency, can have access to such information.</i><p><a href="https://old.reddit.com/r/dredmorbius/comments/5ud243/data_are_liability_book_your_assassination_now/" rel="nofollow">https://old.reddit.com/r/dredmorbius/comments/5ud243/data_ar...</a><p>What is your threat model?<p>Note that <i>your own</i> threat model may not include possibilities which put <i>others</i> at risk.<p>(In fairness, it appear that Protasevich was followed onto the plane itself, suggesting that in-flight availability of manifests played little role. The question of what <i>pre-flight</i> intelligence methods were employed remains open.)