Honestly, I don't know that I'm with Greenwald all the way to the conclusion, here. I think it's just as possible that successive administrations all fell for a mix of sunk cost fallacies, confirmation bias, poor incentives, etc, that caused leadership to receive or only pay attention to the most rosy results, the best possible models, the most positive data.<p>Bureaucracies are weird, byzantine things. To assume malice when, given the information we currently have, incompetence is equally likely seems to me to be editorializing.<p>Is incompetence <i>good</i>? Hell no, and the administration has a <i>lot</i> to answer for. But to assume, not just that the administration didn't know how bad the exit from Afghanistan would be, but that they intentionally lied about it, is a leap that, while possible, I'm not yet willing to make.