While I agree completely with the premise of this article, on the other hand I'm weighing the relatively robust findings by Meehl et al. They find, time and time again, in all sorts of fields, that extremely parsimonious models like equal-weighted linear regression of one or two predictors outperform expert judgment[1].<p>One would think this is cognitively dissonant enough, but it gets worse:<p>This article, with the thesis that good arguments are more important than data, is based on, well, a good argument – not much data. On the other hand, the work by Meehl et al. claiming pretty much the opposite, is based on, well, a lot of data, and maybe not much intuitive reasoning. (There's some, yes, but the main thrust of why I believe it is that variants of the experiment have been replicated reliably.)<p>I don't know what to believe. Fortunately, as I've grown older, I've become more comfortable with holding completely dissonant opinions in my head at the same time.<p>----<p>Edit a few minutes later: This actually prompted me to refresh on the subject. It might be the case that Meehl is actually making the same argument as this article, only it gets distorted when repeated. Some things are reliably measurable; for those things be data-driven. Other things not so much, then use your expertise.<p>----<p>[1]: Here's just one relatively early example: <a href="http://apsychoserver.psych.arizona.edu/JJBAReprints/PSYC621/Dawes_Faust_Meehl_Clinical_vs_actuarial_assessments_1989.pdf" rel="nofollow">http://apsychoserver.psych.arizona.edu/JJBAReprints/PSYC621/...</a>