Smoke Screening: Journalist tests TSA

This article makes some big leaps. It says in the fourth paragraph: "Since 9/11, the U.S. has spent more than $1.1 trillion on homeland security." It seems to imply that this is mostly because of wasteful TSA-like spending.<p>The Department of Homeland Security's FY11 budget authority was around $56 bil. The TSA only accounted for 14% of that money. [1]<p>Just for perspective -- top 5 slices of DHS's FY11 pie: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (20%), U.S. Coast Guard (18%), Transportation Security Administration (14%), Federal Emergency Management Agency (12%), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (10%).<p>Don't get me wrong, I'm not a huge fan of the TSA... I think we all feel a little silly as grownups waiting around in a security line in our socks. But I don't think all the hand waving about "security theater" is really justified. And there are probably quite a few things that fall under "homeland security" that aren't so controversial. Disaster response? Maritime search and rescue? Enforcement of fisheries conservation regulations? Border protection?<p>[1] All numbers from DHS's "FY 2011 Budget in Brief"

I'm a little disappointed with the article when compared to my expectations given the title.<p>Besides using a fraudulent boarding pass, the journo didn't "test" the TSA in any meaningful way. This wasn't like the experiment where a guy got a gun on a plane using his wheelchair, for example. While the article has great information and I agree with almost all of it, I would like to see people demonstrating the uselessness of the TSA rather than just talking about it.

You don't even need photoshop to modify your boarding pass.<p>(These steps work with Opera, I'm not sure about other browsers) 1. Go to print your boarding pass 2. View source 3. Modify any information (such as adding something to show First Class/A-List/etc) 4. Click Apply Changes to make the changes to the HTML show up in the page 5. Click Print<p>A perfect boarding pass with any information you want.<p>What could someone do that's on the watch list? By a ticket under an assumed name, then print out two boarding passes, one with their real name that matches their ID, then another with the assumed name.<p>Since the no-fly list check is only done when the ticket is purchased, use the real ID with real name boarding pass at security to get through (they won't check you against the list). At the gate, go ahead and give them the real boarding pass with the fake name (they won't check your ID at that point).<p>* I am in no way advocating that you do this, just that it's possible and demonstrates a weakness in security <i>

I wish we could get rid of the TSA and spend that resources somewhere else, CIA, FBI, NSA, hell send it to DoE, NSF, maybe fund (more) research in practical(?) renewable energy.<p>But killing the TSA is never going to happen. No career politician is going to commit political harikiri to shut it down.<p>- I do not mind the free hand rubs at the airports though.

Very similar to "The Things He Carried" by The Atlantic back in 2008. Bruce Schneier shows how worthless the TSA is.<p><a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/11/the-things-he-carried/7057/" rel="nofollow">http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/11/the-thin...</a>

Fantastic article!<p>One point I've read elsewhere is that successful Islamic terrorists are a single-use resource, what with their habit of killing themselves during the attack. This means all their terrorism skills are lost with the successful attack, and the pool of competent terrorists shrinks. Not to mention, the wealth of experience and on-the-ground information is lost as well.

The submission might attract more attention if the headline made mention of the fact that Schneier is the person doing the testing.

The last time I went through the airport they did the hand wipe thing. I said "You think terrorist are smart enough to wear gloves when working with chemical explosives?" She shrugged and said "All Clear!"

I'm afraid most of what the government does is theater - meant to distract us while they line their own pockets.

And yeah... the next wave of 'terrorist' attacks won't be airports, but probably consumer-level areas or something that directly affects a large number of every day people (or, just, threatens to): malls, restaurant chains, etc.<p>I posited this idea to friends/family back in 2002: have a large number of geographically distributed attacks on salt/pepper/condiments at chain and independent restaurants around the country at the same time. Dozens/hundreds would get sick or die, and confidence in the food supply would be disrupted for weeks at minimum. "terror-proof" condiment dispensers would be developed, and required on flights (cause our anti-terrorists will still be focused on flying), and it would cost probably $500 in drugs to spike salt/pepper shakers around the country.<p>People thought I was crazy (or a terrorist), but I could swear I read of this being reported on (on a small scale) in 2005 or 2007 - Miami perhaps?<p>I found this: <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/12/20/eveningnews/main7169266.shtml" rel="nofollow">http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/12/20/eveningnews/main71...</a> but it's from 2010 and it's not what I was thinking about.

I don't understand. The agents at the gate always check the boarding pass validity (with the code scanner) and check the name on it against my ID. I haven't tried it but i can imagine that the system wouldn't allow two boarding passes with the same code. Is it that here in Europe we do things properly or did I misunderstood the faking of the boarding pass?

I agree with most of the points in this article, but saying that all people who forge boarding passes will use latex gloves seems false.<p>From my point of view the point of multiple screenings is to increase the difficulty and complexity of pulling off a particular attack. Sure, individually you can think of a way to counter each one, but as you add constraints you reduce the pool of people willing and able to pull it off. (So now you need a person who wants to cause terror, who is willing to blow themselves up, who can forge simple documents, who remembered to wear latex gloves, who can act cool enough to avoid extra screenings when walking past guards with machine guns, etc, etc, etc). Sure some eliminate more than others, but you multiply enough .95s together and you get a small number.

Why wouldn't terrorists hijack private planes now? Some of them are quite large.<p>If we want to see the TSA go away, start hassling the billionaires.<p>But airports are so passe anyway, TSA has moved onto buses, trains and now car searches, journalists are way behind.

I like to think the TSA and their ridiculous measures actually <i>are</i> there purely for the "security theater"... both to reassure the ignorant public, and to misdirect potential terrorists.<p>Of course, I also hope the TSA, DHS, etc have more effective measures in place behind the scenes. I don't know if that's the case, but it would make sense to keep them secret.

When will we get congressional and presidential candidates vowing to shut down the TSA? "I'll shut down the Dept of Education!" was a bit rallying cry for Bachmann a couple months ago, partially with the justification that "It was only started in 1979!". Well, the TSA was started less than 10 years ago, so let's shut that down first.

The 3 oz liquid rule was always a bit laughable to me too. Print 6 fake boarding passes, bring 6 friends, give them 3 ounces of whatever, take 21 ounces on the plane. Makes no sense to me.<p>And still I have to buy a special tiny tube of toothpaste for the safety of the nation.

The article didn't mention what happened when they tried to use the photoshopped boarding pass to board. Maybe they had another real boarding pass somewhere else? Maybe they didn't actually board a plane?<p>Their system makes sure you're supposed to be on the plane when they scan your boarding pass to get on the plane right?