The weird thing to me about this canary document and others like it is that they cover <i>all</i> warrants, not just NSLs.<p>Warrant canaries were a reaction to the NSL process, which is invariably (and, I guess, permanently?) gagged, and was seen as exceptional and in some sense extra-judicial. It would be newsworthy for a service to be NSL'd, and further evidence of dragnet surveillance programs sweeping up Americans.<p>Ordinary search warrants and disclosure demands occur, presumably, all the time; they're issued by courts in individual felony cases, such as for drug conspiracies, child pornography, and white collar criminal conspiracies. Serious crime happens all the time; it's not really all that newsworthy for a warrant to issue in, like, an insider trading case.<p>So, what does it tell us if this particular canary document was taken down? Perhaps the DOJ is working with the intelligence community to dragnet the service, or establish a durable norm of being able to transactionally extract records that will amount to the same thing as a dragnet. Or, maybe, just some random state court judge in Oklahoma decided it was likely that somebody's meth distribution business kept records in that service. One of those is interesting, the other not.<p>Why not just have more than one canary if you're going to do it this way?<p>It's been this way for a long time, and I'm just now having this thought, so it's equally likely that my take here is just faulty; if so, let me know.