Shame is toxic, but the issue <i>is</i> critical for startup's and worth discussing.<p>Depositors making individual decisions? Ok.<p>Funds advising their companies? Ok, but it really hides the agency: deciders are in the funds (what CEO would refuse that advice?), but the companies are the responsible actors.<p>Now, would it matter if most of those funds were responding to their investors, say, Saudi's or Russians or the Chinese Communist Party, or to a consortium of friends who had shorted the bank? Most would say it does matter, but AFAICT it's perfectly legal, and no outsider would ever know the difference.<p>Market self-regulation, insurance, and investment diversification all depend on agents acting independently in their own interests, say, of making money.<p>Once agents are coordinating, or colluding, or have other dominant strategic interests, market self-regulation fails. And everyone else, who reasonably relied on the market behaving stochastically or in response to economic forces, loses.<p>One might hope that if this were all good, the response to a wall of shame would be a wall of honor, with transparency around decisions. But confidentiality is a key feature for any investment firms, so the best we'll get are retrospective letters of intent.<p>Aside from bad actors, the irony is that high federal rates means more risk-taking from banks, not less. SVB assets were good and safe, albeit not worth much (as the auction is showing).<p>I would have no problem with new rules saying that firms with assets big enough relative to the bank needed to schedule major withdrawals in advance. There's really no other reason than a bank run to move $100M emergently. (There'll be a secondary market for large urgent transfers, but it won't cost much, securitized with a pending transfer.)<p>So: yes the system is susceptible to bad actors, and there's no good way to respond without throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Really society's only defense is that the wealthy are getting wealthy enough legally that there's no real need to go all-out.<p>Aside from the moral hazard of covering bank risks, there's another moral hazard in creating opportunity and incentive for an already-confidential and largely unregulated industry to collude. It might push good investors into combines with bad actors, amplifying ill effects.<p>What's shameful really is that these systemic gaps are relatively obvious to thousands of the involved engineer/MBA/JD's, but everyone greedily grabs their local maxima, instead of insisting the system work right. That's where I'd welcome leadership, some way to reduce coordination costs.