FNRS III/DSV-0/DSV-1 were engineered for fail-safe, elegant simplicity over cost and bulk. Power failure or operator opens the shot releases, and positive buoyancy is assured. There's nothing in the buoyancy filler (gasoline "balloons") that is ever not equalized with external pressure or could be crushed.<p>Archimède was a French Navy contemporary of the Trieste class but weighing 60% less.<p>Deepsea Challenger and Limiting Factor do away with 92% of 150 t of Trieste class mass to roughly 12 t each.<p>HeavensGate& did away with another 2 t but couldn't take <i>half</i> the pressure using unsound design, testing, and manufacturing processes and unproven materials in a rush to cash-in on commercial adventure experiences.<p>& I meant OceansGate. Darwin Award engineering failures are best syncretized as an admixture of derision of crackpot approaches but with the seriousness of regulatory safety investigation failure chain analysis translated into an oft-repeated undergrad engineering case study. It also seems apparent to not overlook the breadth and depth of human factors extending into a myriad of areas including design, engineering, manufacturing, maintenance, rework, and testing regimes far beyond just operation. After blameless data gathering for exhaustive contributing factor analysis, final findings uncovering evidence of negligence should be severely punished by regulators (if there's anyone still living to sue or foreclose on). <a href="https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/design_approvals/human_factors" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/design_approvals/human...</a>