The article is a bit weird, so here's my summary of the situation, as someone in the security field:<p>- Berstein, an extremely esteemed security researcher[0], published a long blog post last week[1] criticizing NIST's standardization process for new Post-Quantum-Crypto algorithms. He is focusing on the selection of Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (think TLS key exchange). Two big options are Kyber and NTRU (coauthored by Berstein).<p>- His main complaint is that NIST is playing fast and loose with the selection process, and had disqualified a fast NTRU variant due to barely not meeting a certain security threshold. The missing variant makes NTRU look slower and less flexible than it actually is.<p>- Meanwhile, NIST accepted a similar fast Kyber variant based on shaky assumptions. Berstein argues at length that it doesn't meet the security threshold either and should be disqualified. Funnily, NIST used Berstein's own research in (seemingly) incorrect fashion to argue for Kyber's security.<p>- There's an air of impropriety, as if NIST was favoring one algorithm over the other, for unknown reasons. And in the beginning of the post, Berstein shows the results of his recent lawsuit to reveal more information about the internal NIST process: it seems that NIST and NSA met more often than previously thought.<p>My interpretation leans more towards NIST making an internal mistake in evaluating the algorithms, rather than NSA pushing its agenda. One could argue that Berstein is sour that his algorithm might not be picked, and is trying underhanded tactics. On the other hand, he does have excellent reputation, and convincingly argues that NIST made an important mistake and is not transparent enough.<p>[0] <a href="https://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2016-March/028824.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2016-March/0...</a><p>[1] <a href="https://blog.cr.yp.to/20231003-countcorrectly.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://blog.cr.yp.to/20231003-countcorrectly.html</a>