The most useful quality in this analysis is to the consequences side of risk:consequences.<p>The risk of loss of TSMC is being worked on far too slowly. Nothing the west can do will stop China seeking better VLSI production capabilities and blocking access to ASML is only encouraging them to scale up.<p>The loss of "face" and effective geopolitical influence would be a persisting problem. Regional alliances have some role here, but honestly? Nobody wants a shooting war.<p>The economic consequences I think might be capable of being offset, and in many ways are shared by China. It's a story of two sides. War is only partially ameliorative to a moribund domestic economy and continuing isolation of China risks much of the reward to their citizens for ongoing passivity.<p>Risk:consequence stories always have the third leg of the triad - likelihood. You plan for even unlikely eventualities because that's risk management.<p>I personally think an invasive takeover of Taiwan is highly unlikely in the short to medium term because of the rivers of blood from a defended invasion attempt: China has low experience of this, and I tend to think has a low tolerance for failure and a defended beachhead in modern warfare is going to play out differently to day, bloody Omaha was the exception and this time would be the norm, not to mention losses at sea.<p>Which leaves the other, non invasion led mechanistic approaches to reunion. I'm unsure how likely they are.