"Really, it’s hard not to wonder whether some current civil forfeiture practices represent much less than a revival of
the archaic common-law deodand. The deodand required the forfeiture of any object responsible for a death—say, a
knife, cart, or horse—to the Crown. Today, the idea seems much the same even if the practice now sweeps more broadly, requiring almost any object involved in almost any serious offense to be surrendered to the government in amends.<p>The hardships deodands often imposed seem more than faintly familiar, too. Deodands required forfeiture regardless of the fault of the owner, himself sometimes the deceased. Not infrequently, the practice left impoverished families without the means to support themselves, faced not only with the loss of a loved one but also with the loss of a horse or perhaps a cart essential to their livelihoods. Sometimes grieving families could persuade authorities or
juries to forgo a deodand, but often not, and generally the burden to avoid a deodand was on them.<p>As time went on, too, curiously familiar financial incentives wormed their way into the system. Originally, the Crown was supposed to pass the deodand (literally, a thing given to God) onto the church 'as an expiation for the sou[l]'
of the deceased. Over time, though, the Crown increasingly chose instead to sell off its rights to deodands to local lords and others. These recipients inevitably wound up with a strong interest in the perpetuation of the enterprise. Ultimately, the deodand’s appeal faded in England, and this Court has held that it 'did not become part of the common-law tradition of this country.' But has something not wholly unlike it gradually reemerged in our own lifetimes? [1]"<p>[1] <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-585_k5fm.pdf" rel="nofollow">https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-585_k5fm.pdf</a> <i>Gorsuch's concurrence, beginning on page 18</i>